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OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES: EQUALITY IN SEX
EDUCATION, CONTRACEPTIVE ACCESS, AND WORKFAMILY POLICY
Cornelia T.L. Pillara
Reproductive rights are traditionally understood to be protected by the
privacy aspect of the due process liberty guarantee, but equal protection is also
at the heart of the matter. Many of us intuitively know the close relationship
between sex equality and abortion rights, and the law, too, is starting to reflect
it.
This Symposium broadens the focus of traditional abortion-rights
jurisprudence to develop equality-based analyses of abortion rights. Widening
the angle even further, this Article looks at sex equality and reproductive rights
issues beyond the core right to abortion.
Bringing into the picture issues beyond abortion helps to show the close
and mutually reinforcing relationship between sex equality and reproductive
rights. In fuller context, we see how reproductive rights are a hinge pin
between liberty and equality: Women need practical access to a range of
reproductive choices to enjoy sex equality, yet they need equality to make
reproductive decisions freely and in ways that are responsible to themselves,
those they love, and the broader society. Even with the abortion right
protected under Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, sex inequality and discrimination make that right alone
inadequate to secure reproductive choice equally for all women-young and
mature, poor and rich, rural and urban. I Making law's existing promise of
reproductive freedom effective for more women is a critical part of securing it
in years to come.

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Helen Alvare, Ederlina Co,
David D. Cole. Anne Dailey, Reva Seigel, and Robin West for their comments on drafts of this Article.
I See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCfION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Angela Hooten, A Broader Vision of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing
Mainstream and Latina Feminism, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 59,60, 86 (2005); Deborah L.
Rhode, Politics and Pregnancy: Adolescent Mothers and Public Policy, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
99, 99-100, 127-31 (1992); Julie F. Kay, Note, If Men Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for
Federal Funding of Abortion Under a National Health Care Plan, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 349, 365--Q6 (1994)
(highlighting limitations imposed on reproductive choice by geographic as well as financial obstacles to
abortion).
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Paradoxically, while reproductive rights should be doubly constitutionally
protected by the overlapping liberty and equality guarantees, that dual pedigree
can instead leave reproductive rights more vulnerable. Arguments from
equality may be weakened by the sense that laws and policies need not change
to be fairer to women if, supplied with the liberty to control fertility and have
abortions, women thereby become "just like men." Meanwhile, to the extent
that reproductive rights are important because they advance sex equality,
support for abortion and other reproductive rights can be deflected into efforts
to make society more equal in other ways for women, including women with
children. We must eschew that shell game because the truth is that
reproductive rights are important both for the reasons that the Constitution
recognizes liberty rights to privacy and bodily integrity and for the reasons that
it recognizes the right to sex equality.
To highlight some of the opportunities created by bringing equality
analysis more fully into the mix, this Article looks at three distiryct,
reproduction-related sites of sex discrimination: sex-role stereotyping in sex
education, insurance policy exclusions of women's contraceptive health care,
and shortfalls in work-family policies in our historically male-oriented labor
market. The sex education discussion in Part I criticizes abstinence-only-untilmarriage sex education curricula. It brings into focus those curricula's
persistent, official promulgation of retrogressive, anti-egalitarian sexual
ideologies-of male pleasure and female shame, male recreation and female
responsibility, male agency and female passivity, and male personhood and
female parenthood. I argue for a counter-stereotyping sex education that
affirms women's and men's desire, sexual agency, and responsibility. The
same principles that presumptively forbid other kinds of sex-based official
action should prevent public schools from training students in accordance with
double standards and stereotyping-training that also impairs reproductive
justice.
Part II, on contraceptive equity, illuminates the persistence of conflicting
legal approaches in equality law to women's capacity to become pregnant: One
sees pregnancy as an incidental, gender-neutral fact about some people that can
be disfavored without raising equality problems, whereas the other
comprehends discrimination based on reproductive distinctiveness as a core,
constitutive aspect of sex inequality. The law should clearly affirm women's
right to use contraception to control when and whether they become pregnant
as an indispensable element of sex equality.
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Finally, the work-family discussion identifies the lack of realistic
opportunities to both nurture children and work for pay as a major concern for
sex equality and reproductive rights. At its best, equality law would seek to
minimize the extent to which social policy on work and family limits women's
full economic and political citizenship and men's relationships of care for
children and other dependents. Each of these three issues presents concrete
and critical opportunities for deploying equality law and egalitarian cultural
norms in support of reproductive justice.
Defining reproductive rights broadly to include issues like sex education,
contraceptive access, and work-family policy is necessary because the
unwantedness of a pregnancy and the demand for abortion do not occur in a
vacuum. Various forms of inequality and stereotyping contribute to a status
quo in which many women get pregnant in circumstances in which they either
do not want children, or want children yet feel they cannot have them. Girls
and women disproportionately are taught to be in denial about their own sexual
urges, and yet rely inappropriately on their sex appeal. The denial occurs both
ways: Women are expected to deny the presence of their sexual desire (to
guard chastity), and to deny its absence (to be sexually responsive to men). In
a world in which such denial is the norm, women will lack the kind of agency
and responsibility needed to meet their own desires for pleasure, well-being,
support, and meaning in their lives. When the vast majority of women are
(hetero)sexually active, yet women-controlled contraception is not recognized
as a basic component of health care, it should not be surprising that millions of
women face unwanted pregnancies. Society tolerates unbridled and even
aggressive male sexuality as "natural" or lauds it as strong. Society valorizes
lack of female desire, even while considering that lack inevitable, and so
irrelevant, when women's lack of desire does not match male wants. People
generally still view child rearing as women's gratification and their domain,
and accept men's failure to do and value it as personal, private choice, offlimits to criticism.
Both abstinence-only sex education and insurance
noncoverage of contraception help to sustain that status quo. If those
circumstances do not change, men will continue to fail to take their part of the
responsibility for sexual intercourse and its potentially lifelong consequences,
and women will continue to accede to sex inequality structured around and
rationalized in terms of reproduction.
Reproductive choice is not only about avoiding unwanted pregnancy, but
also about having wanted children. The paucity of family-friendly workplace
policy in the United States is a major issue, not only of sex equality, but also of
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reproductive rights. People who might want children should not be forced to
choose between nurturing a family and earning the income needed to support
it. Our law, institutional arrangements, and culture need to be restyled so that
mothers are not routinely "mommy tracked," men are prompted to share in
caretaking, and workplace and social-welfare policies support women and men
equally to realize their potential at home and work. The failures of our law,
policy, and culture to do more to enable women and men alike to be both direct
caregivers and successful working people interferes with genuine reproductive
choice-and sex equality-for all.
The broader focus advocated here also seeks common cause between
people opposed to legal abortion and those who support the abortion right.
Importantly, in each of the three areas explored in this Article, the life of the
fetus-the crux of the moral controversy over abortion-is not implicated. In
each area, if society were more willing to recognize the demands of equality,
there might well be less need for abortion. Equality analysis can help to
encourage sexual agency and responsibility, facilitate access to contraceptives
for both sexes, and make parenting more attractive than abortion by making it
less impoverishing and disempowering for women and a greater priority for
men. Abortion opponents and advocates alike should favor extending sex
equality norms in these and related areas?
It makes sense to view equality law as a source of support for reproductive
rights in part because, while abortion rights in the United States have been
rolled back since the 1980s, the law of sex equality has gained momentum here
and abroad. Equality law has coalesced around a vision of women and men
equally entitled to pursue chosen goals with respect to education, work,
intimacy, and family, and equally obligated to shoulder the duties that our
citizenship and our actions incur. Equal protection's basic commitment to the
principle that biology need not determine destiny means that women (and men)
must have equal life chances even though the sexes are biologically distinct.
In particular, equality law increasingly apprehends the central role that both
expectations about maternity and the realities of parenting play in sex
discrimination. The legal project of enabling women and men freely to chart
life courses without systematic, sex-based constraint confronts a long history
and culture of traditional domesticity, which casts women primarily as mothers
2 Equality analysis may also support the abortion right itself for many of the same reasons set forth here,
but elaborating that argument in the specific context of abortion is beyond the scope of this Article. Such
analysis presumably would reinforce the abortion right and accommodate exceedingly persuasive
governmental interests in maternal health and fetal life.

HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 944 2006-2007

2007]

OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES

945

and family caretakers, and men primarily as breadwinners unfettered by direct
family-care responsibilities.
Courts and legislatures have shown some·
initiative in breaking down the sex-based "maternal wall" that has cabined
women's progress in the labor market, and have begun to hint at how the law
needs to open the way for men and women better to share responsibilities at
home. Under the legally dominant, modern vision of sex equality, individuals
may agree to live out their own sexuality or sex roles in ways that might strike
others as stereotypical, traditional, innovative, or even radic.al. The law,
however, assumes and protects the equal rights and opportunities of women
and men by working to foster and assure official neutrality and to repudiate a
decidedly nonneutral legal history regarding the roles that members of either
sex might play in sexuality, work, and family.
It is not just because equality rights are strong and abortion rights are under
attack that it makes sense for reproductive rights advocates to turn to equal
protection, but also because sex equality is fundamentally at stake in
controversies over reproductive law and policy. Reproductive rights, including
the rights to contraception and abortion, play a central role in freeing women
from historically routine conscription into maternity. It is reproductive rights
that have begun to allow women to decide whether and when to follow the
path of motherhood. Our Constitution declares our liberty to protect our own
life and health. As a society we have the knowledge to educate young people
about reproduction, the means to prevent and in some circumstances to end
unwanted pregnancies, and the social resources to support parenting. At this
point in our history, women's equality is infringed when such reproductive
freedoms are denied without forceful governmental justification.
The turn to equality found some impetus in the joint opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 3 Casey recognized that
women's ability "to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." 4
In reaffirming the core of the abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade,5 Casey
linked the abortion right to the constitutional prohibition against government

3 505 u.s. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, joined in relevant part
by Justices Blackmun and Stevens). In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), decided as this issue
went to press, the four dissenting justices emphasized that abortion rights claims "center on a woman's
autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature." Id. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The Carhart majority opinion did not discuss the equality implications of abortion rights.
4 Casey, 505 U.S. at 835.
5 410 U.S. 113(\973).
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assigning women the traditional, gendered social roles of wife and mother-a
prohibition that is increasingly understood to lie at the heart of equal
protection. 6 Under abortion laws,
the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. . .. Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision
of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture. 7
Antiabortion laws and other restraints on reproductive freedom not only
enforce women's incubation of unwanted pregnancies, but also prescribe a
"vision of the woman's role" as mother and caretaker of children in a way that
is at odds with equal protection.
Although the Court's recognition of the connection between equality and
reproductive rights has been incipient and fragile, equality is a natural
conceptual partner to liberty in support of reproductive choice. Renewed
attacks on abortion have turned attention to how the Equal Protection Clause,
and the right to sex equality more generally, might advance reproductive selfdetermination. Controversy and conflict about abortion has also led some of us
to seek new areas of agreement and better ways to move forward together. The
tum to equality, properly understood, has the potential to do more than provide
an alternative defense of reproductive rights; it brings into the open a truth that
millions have experienced, which is that reproductive rights really are
fundamentally about sex equality. Equality analysis offers promising avenues
to enlist more support for the project of making reproductive justice, and the
sex equality it underwrites, a reality for all.
l.

SEX EDUCATION: THE EQUALITY RIGHT AGAINST INCULCATION OF SEXBASED DOUBLE STANDARDS

Sex education lies at the crossroads between reproductive rights and sex
equality. It is at once about sexuality (feelings and actions relating to "having
sex"), sex (being anatomically male or female), and gender (the cultural
meanings associated with maleness and femaleness). Sex education is a
critical site of acculturation regarding both reproduction and sex roles.
Tinkering with sex education is risky business because of our deep, passionate,

6

7

See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,730-31 (2003).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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personal, and powerfully conflicting norms on those matters, 8 and because sex
can be a source of danger as well as pleasure. 9 Because sex education's very
purpose is to affect young people's understandings and behavior, however, it
provides an opportunity for change. 10
The new trend in sex education in the United States is away from
comprehensive sex education and toward abstinence-only-until-marriage
curricula, which advocate that refraining from sexual aCtiVIty until
heterosexual marriage is the sole acceptable form of sexual behavior. Those
curricula include only negative information about birth control and abortion,
such as contraceptive failure rates and assertions of adverse health
consequences of abortion. They omit the fuller information traditionally
provided in comprehensive sex education on the ground that it tacitly
encourages premarital teen sex, which abstinence-only proponents view as
immoral and harmful. Abstinence-only curricula receive large and growing
blocks of federal funding and are already taught in one third of America's sex
education classrooms. I I Progressives criticize abstinence-only programs as
8 See generally JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (2004); KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL, WARRING VIEWS ON SEX-AND SEX
EDUCATION-SINCE THE SIXTIES (2006); Sharon Lerner, The Sex·Ed Divide, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2001, at
A15.
9 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987) (decrying the reality of pervasive rape, incest, and other forms of sexual abuse perpetrated by men
against women); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 (1989)
(arguing that patriarchy is expressed and maintained through sexualized dominance); Carole S. Vance, More
Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289
(1993) (describing the conundrum posed by feminists' appreciation that sex can both pose danger and promise
pleasure to women).
10 The intensity of the controversy over sex education might seem disproportionate to the stakes because
sex education in schools is only a fragment of the information and socialization that influences young people's
approaches to sex and gender. Given the volume and complexity of other influences, exactly what is taught in
sex education class may matter less than we think. Those limitations must qualify my own claims as well.
The relationship between legal and cultural change is complex, and by focusing on the former, I do not mean
to imply otherwise. Nonetheless, the fact that sex education in the public schools is such a "hot button" issue
suggests that people pay special attention to authoritative, public positions on sex, gender, and youth. Sex
education in public school remains vitally important because schools are one of the few places where
constitutional equality norms can be brought to bear directly to help young people to get fair and accurate
information about sex.
II Three major sources of funding for abstinence-only curricula are: (I) the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 42 U.S.c. § 710(b) (2000) (providing funding to
states for abstinence-only curricula), (2) Special Programs of Regional and National Significance/CommunityBased Abstinence Education (SPRANS/CBAE), see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families, Fact Sheet: Community-Based Abstinence Education Program,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/contentlabstinence/community.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006)
(providing funding directly to community organization for abstinence-only programs, funded by the FY 2005

HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 947 2006-2007

948

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

inaccurate and as counterproductive in avoiding unwanted pregnancy and
sexually transmitted disease,12 but scholars and advocates have paid inadequate
attention to those curricula's propagation of sex stereotypes and double
standards.
The abstinence-only approach is permeated with stereotyped messages and
sex-based double standards about acceptable male and female sexual behavior
and appropriate social roles. Public school teaching of gender stereotypes
violates the constitutional bar against sex stereotyping and is vulnerable to
equal protection challenge. The equality defect is also related to the more
vocal objections that abstinence-only curricula are ineffective: Teaching sexstereotyped behavior undermines the shared sense of agency and responsibility
that young people need to avoid coerced or unwanted sex, unplanned and
unprotected sex, and unwanted pregnancy.
The Supreme Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence sets a very high
bar against sex-based stereotyping and overgeneralization. Under a line of
cases culminating in United States v. Virginia (VMl),13 even statistically
accurate generalizations about "typically male or female tendencies"-such as
men's greater aggressiveness versus women's comparatively more cooperative
temperament, or men's tendency to harass and women's victimization by sex
harassment--cannot be grounds for official, sex-based discrimination. 14 VMI
builds on a long line of precedent that treats even laws enacted ostensibly to
favor or protect women as unconstitutionally discriminatory due in large part
to the stereotypes they perpetuate. The doctrine often seems more centrally
concerned with the metastatic potential of sex-role stereotyping that sex-based
disparate treatment reflects and reinforces than with the often benign or
minimal concrete differences in treatment themselves. It thus recognizes that
sex-role stereotyping is itself harmful because it projects patriarchal messages
that make discrimination at once more likely and less apparent.

appropriations bill and administered under the authority of PRWORA by the Department of Health and Human
Services), and (3) the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), 42 U.S.c. § 300z (2000). These sources account
for $167 million budgeted for 2005. See H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 108TH CONG., THE CONTENT OF
FEDERALLY fuNDED ABSTINENCE-ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1-4 (Comm. Print 2004), available at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.govlDocumentsl20041201102153-50247.pdf (prepared for Rep. Henry A.
Waxman) (describing extent of funding for and adoption of those curricula).
12 LUKER, supra note 8, at 238.
13 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
14 [d. at 541, 544, 550.
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Constitutional resistance to stereotyping springs from equal protection
values of fair treatment of people as individuals, opposition to systemic gender
hierarchy, and the pragmatic challenges of breaking down patriarchy and
reimagining a society without it. Given the vast overlap between women's and
men's characteristics, as well as the wide range within each sex, individuals'
actual qualities very often are gender atypical (although our own confirmation
biases may make that harder to notice). When government acts in ways that
routinely deny that reality, it disrespects our individual humanity. Equal
protection opposes sex-based disregard of individual qualities in part because
that disregard reinforces historically entrenched gender hierarchy.
Stereotyping makes patterns of inequality seem more natural, inevitable, and
even invisible. A history of imaginations and opportunities circumscribed by
perceptions of "average" or "typical" male versus female sex characteristics,
and habits of exaggerating the relevance and scope of sex differences, are part
of the architecture of patriarchal systems. Antistereotyping doctrine helps to
break those habits to permit us to move beyond that history.
It may yet seem perverse that equal protection doctrine goes to so much
trouble to resist factually based generalizations about the sexes when they are,
by and large, accurate. Why do the Supreme Court cases insist so firmly on
the possibility of gender atypicality? One function of antistereotyping
doctrine's special protection of space for gender atypicality is to help to deal
with challenges posed for sex equality theory by the social construction of
gender.
We are all powerfully socialized to replicate current gender
arrangements and to accept them as "natural." The remarkable human
adaptability even to onerous and unjust circumstances, meanwhile, blunts our
Those well-documented phenomena-gender
antennae for inequality. 15
socialization and adaptive preferences--combine to make it difficult to
anticipate what sex equality will look like, and consequently to know quite
how best to seek it. Gender atypicality is thus especially important and
liberating in helping us to experience and envision the possibilities;
anti stereotyping doctrine is its legal protection.
Despite its strong support in recent constitutional doctrine, however, the
anti stereotyping theory is also in tension with one older equal protection
precedent on regulation of teenage sexuality. A plurality of the Supreme Court

15 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-40 (1983);
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Inteiference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131, 1138-39,
1146-48 (1986).
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in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County sustained a California law
criminalizing men's but not women's participation in "statutory rape"-i.e.,
intercourse with a rninor. 16 The statute and the Court's opinion relied on and
reinforced the very stereotypes of women's passivity and men's agency in sex
that I argue the Constitution rejects. The opinion justified the statute's
applicability only to men on the ground that "males alone can physiologically
cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid,,,17 even though as
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, "the risk-creating conduct that this
statute is designed to prevent requires the participation of two persons-one
male and one female.,,18 The plurality also embraced the double standard that
women's chastity, more than men's, should be an object of governmental
solicitude. Underage sex is distinctively a "problem" for women, the opinion
suggested,19 and accepted that some legislators were seeking to protect "young
females [but not males] from ... the loss of chastity.,,20 The state's post-hoc
assertion of an interest in exempting girls to encourage them to report
violations is constitutionally offensive in its assignment of a sexual gatekeeper
function to girls only. Under Michael M., girls, and not boys, qualify as "sex
police," without regard to their actual level of responsibility in a violation?1
16 450 u.s. 464 (1981) (plurality).
17 Id. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18 Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 469 (plurality) ("fA] legislature may provide for the special problems of women.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20 Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plurality accepted the state's asserted interest in
pregnancy prevention without evidence of any relative ineffectiveness of sex-neutral statutory rape laws,
which equally prohibit women from seducing young and nai"ve men. The plurality tellingly concluded that the
California law "reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall
more heavily on the female than on the male." Id. at 476; see also id. at 479 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(referring to sexes being differently situated with respect to "intercourse and pregnancy") (emphases added).
Those justices apparently viewed intercourse as a problem for underage women, even apart from unwanted
pregnancy, because they understood it to impugn women's virtue in a way that it did not for their male peers.
21 For all its discussion of protecting young women, Michael M. implicitly underscores the law's
inadequacy in protecting women who "ask for it." Women's well-founded fear that they will be branded as
licentious and will not be believed is a much larger deterrent to the reporting of sex offenses than is any risk of
prosecution under sex-neutral statutory rape laws. Prosecutors rely on statutory rape laws in part as
alternatives to full-blown rape charges where lack of consent may be hard to prove. In Michael M., the
apparent difficulty with the rape charge was that Sharon (age 17) initially walked down the railroad tracks with
the defendant (age 18), lay on a bench with him and willingly kissed him. When she told him to stop and tried
to get up, he slugged her in the face two or three times, pushed her down on the bench and proceeded to force
his penis into her vagina anyway. See 450 U.S. at 483 and n.* (Blackman, 1., concurring in the judgment)
(testimony from preliminary hearing). Perhaps it was because her initial conduct seemed so horny (or "slutty,"
as the sexual double standard would have it) that prosecutors thought a jury would find her effectively
ineligible to say "no" to intercourse. The case was tried as statutory rape, to which consent is deemed
irrelevant. The sexual double standards that Michael M. helps to sustain are themselves factors in the

HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 950 2006-2007

2007)

OUR OTHER REPRODUCTfVE CHOICES

951

Constitutional analysis of stereotyping in sex education pits VMl's
aspirational egalitarianism against Michael M's more fearful gender
protectionism; whether through narrow construction or overruling of Michael
M., it is the anti stereotyping principle of VMI that should apply. The double
standards about sexuality and sex roles in abstinence-only education are as
widespread and harmful as those the Court has confidently rejected in the
whole line of antistereotyping cases. Men's lust has long been stereotyped as a
powerful, natural force, and male virility celebrated, whereas women have
been characterized as the objects of men's desires rather than subjects of their
own.
Women who express their sexual desire have historically been
denigrated as dirty, threatening "sluts" or "whores," and women who have sex
outside of marriage have been typed as "fallen," "ruined," "damaged," not
"good girls," or "not marriage material"-terms simply not used against
sexually active young men. Historically, men have been thought to have a
primitive sexuality "that constantly [seeks] outlet," in contrast to women's
"more civilized, contingent sexuality that [can] be subordinated to the needs of
both family and society.'.22 Traditionally, sex could be a source of pleasure
and power for men; for women it has been associated with risk and shame.
Public schools have a constitutional responsibility to avoid inculcating students
with those harmful stereotypes.
The reproductive-rights stakes in sex education are significant. The choice
between a stereotyped and an egalitarian path can influence whether women
and men learn to deal with one another as equals and take responsibility for
sexuality and procreative capacity, or whether they live out existing sexual
double standards that help to foster, among other ills, sexual coercion and high
rates of unwanted pregnancy. Sexual double standards set up both young
women and men to act irresponsibly. The notion that male sex drives are
irrepressible, the valorization of male sexual "conquests," and the failure to
hold men accountable to care for the children they father all encourage
heedless and even lawless male sexual behavior, destructive male-to-male peer
pressure, and disregard of women's humanity?3 Relying on young women to

underenforcement of rape and sexual abuse laws. The antidote to that rests not in exempting females from
legal sanctions, but in rejecting the culture of disparate shaming of females about sex, and, more generally, in
reforms that decrease the extent to which women remain beholden to the men who coerce them.
22 LUKER, supra note 8, at 56.
23 Abetting unwanted impregnation of women is not the only way that sex role stereotypes harmfully
implicate men. Stereotyping is itself insulting and limiting for men, cabining them into restrictive roles and
stigmatizing those who stray from masculine gender norms. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy alld Illequality:
Towards a Substallfive Femillism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 24 (theorizing patriarchy as a system of "male
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be the gatekeepers of chastity and to respond with denial and shame to their
own sexual drives, touting motherhood as their best destiny, and encouraging
women to care more about their relationships with men than their own plans
intensify women's ambivalence and difficulty in negotiating their own drives,
desires, and best interests. 24 Failure to acknowledge women's very real and
powerful sexual urges also abets sexual abuse and rape: If women are taught to
deny their desire, their "no's" appear ambiguous, maiGng it easier for men to
believe that "no means yes"-i.e., that male insistence will merely lead to what
both "really" want. The female chastity norm also punishes women who
repudiate it-or are presumed to do so-by viewing them as "fair game,"
disentitled to protection from uninvited sex. That negative implication is
deeply racialized: Black women and other women of color, who are considered
promiscuous by nature and thus ineligible for the chastity pedestal, have
consistently been unprotected or underprotected against sexual abuse?5
It is not an option in sex education to say nothing about sex stereotypes.
Gender and sex roles have become pervasive topics, both implicitly and
explicitly, in sex education curricula. Historically, basic sex education taught
students about the fundamentals of human sexuality, including menstruation,
the reproductive process, and, increasingly, the avoidance of unwanted
pregnancy and disease?6 Sex education in the United States has moved
beyond those anatomical basics, however, as schools have responded to
students' need for guidance on how to navigate the social, emotional, and
ethical shoals of sex and sexuality.27 Sex education that discusses such matters
inevitably also addresses gender roles. Once that door is open, either
traditional gender roles are accepted and reinforced, or the risks of stereotyping
must be made explicit and restrictive social generalizations about men and
women challenged.
distrust and fear of other men" that valorizes men's control and domination of other men); Mary Anne C.
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1,3 (1995) (arguing that "[tJhe man who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly
despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for descending from his masculine gender privilege to do
so"). And men, too, are victims of the kinds of sexual aggression that patriarchal cultures foster. See Marc
Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,52 (2004).
24 See Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of Desire,
58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29, 30-43 (1988); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law,
and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 182-83,206-08 (2001); see also Michelle Fine & Sara I. McClelland,
Sexuality Education and Desire: Still Missing After All These Years, 76 HAKv. EDUC. REv. 297 (2006).
25 See generally IGmberie Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467,
1470 (1992).
26 IRVINE, supra note 8; LUKER, supra note 8, at 201.
27 LUKER, supra note 8, at 85-86.
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As social context has joined the technical details in sex education courses,
however, sex education conservatives have mobilized in protest against
comprehensive sex education curricula. They have, with organizational
effectiveness beyond their numbers, driven sex education toward "traditional
values" and have won substantial governmental support for abstinence-only
curricula. Sex education conservatives generally believe that women and men
should play distinct roles in sexuality, family, and the labor market. For them,
females' chastity is more important than males'; responsibility for guarding
chastity is assigned particularly to females; marriage is the only proper venue
for sexual intimacy; men's sex drive and sexual satisfaction is privileged while
women's is demonized or ignored; and childrearing is viewed as primarily
women's responsibility. These ideas are traditional, historically familiar, and
often rooted in fundamentalist or other religious beliefs?8
Abstinence-only curricula implicitly and explicitly perpetuate the
stereotyped double standards of virility versus chastity, homemaker versus
breadwinner, subject versus object of desire. According to popular abstinenceonly curricular materials, men have a naturally strong sex drive that women
lack, and it is up to women to be the sexual gatekeepers. "A young man's
natural desire for sex is already strong due to testosterone," one curriculum
states; in contrast, women who "fantasize about sex" do so as a result of a
regrettable process of having been "culturally conditioned.,,29 One curriculum
cautions that "[a] man is usually less discriminating [than a woman] about
those to whom he is physically attracted.,,30 The fact that a man might make
sexual advances towards a woman does not necessarily mean that he cares for
her, abstinence-only materials assert, but perhaps only that he sees her as an
outlet for his sex drive. 31 Men, the curricula hint, are only after that "one
thing.,,32 Because male sex drive is so unrestrained, "[t]he girl may need to put

28 [d. at 147, 159,228.
29 Sexuality Information and Education Council of the U.S. (SIECUS), No New Money for Abstinence·
Only-Until-Marriage Programs, In Their Own Words: What Abstinence-OnIY-Until-Marriage Programs Say,
http://www.nonewmoney.orglownWords.html(last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (quoting COLEEN KELLY MAST,
SEX RESPEcr: STUDENT WORKBOOK II (2001».
30 [d. (quoting WAIT (WHY AM I TEMPTED) TRAINING, WORKSHOP MANUAL 37 (1998».
31 [d.
32 See, e.g., id. (quoting MAST, supra note 29, at 94) (teaching that "[a] guy who wants to respect girls is
distracted by sexy clothes and remembers her for one thing" and further explaining that men are "turned on by
their senses and women by their hearts"). The classic warning to young women that men are "only after one
thing" encapsulates in a phrase familiar to millions of people a sexual double standard that weighs females',
but not males', chastity as more important than their sexual fulfillment. See, e.g., Emily Maguire, Teenage
Kicks, OBSERVER, Aug. 14,2005, at 4 (describing author's self-destructive reactions to her own adolescent sex

HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 953 2006-2007

954

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

the brakes on first to help the boy.,,33 Nowhere are students warned about girls
taking advantage of boys for kicks, or told that boys must also take
responsibility to help girls restrain their lust.
Double standards about sex drive and chastity in abstinence-only curricula
are embedded in a larger picture of women and men playing traditional roles in
the family and the public sphere. A decision to practice abstinence until
34
marriage assumes early, heterosexual marriage and early childbearing. The
expectation is not that marriage will be delayed until a person's late twenties or
early thirties so that both parents can complete higher education and establish
themselves at work, but that couples will marry young and the woman will
become a family caretaker, principally supported by her husband, who remains
relatively free of care-giving duties to pursue his career. Women, one
abstinence-only curriculum teaches, need "financial support," whereas men
need "domestic support" and "admiration. ,,35
Another maintains that
"[w]omen gauge their happiness and judge their success on their relationships.
Men's happiness and success hinge on their accomplishments.,,36 Young
women, according to a leading abstinence-only curriculum, "care less about
37
achievement and their futures" than do their male peers.
These curricula
suggest that there are two tracks in sex and two tracks in life, one male, and
one female?8
Because of strong differences of OpInIOn among parents about the
appropriateness of abstinence-only versus comprehensive sex education, some
schools now offer both and allow students and their families to choose, but this
"choice" might itself exacerbate the sex-role stereotypes present within
abstinence-only curricula. In a profile of a Minnesota school district's conflict
drives in the face of sex education rife with double standards, including that "boys were only after one thing,
and if you gave them that, you would never see them again") (emphasis added).
33 SIECUS, supra note 29 (quoting MAUREEN GALLAGHER DURAN, REASONABLE REASONS TO WAIT:
STUDENT WORKBOOK 96 (2002».
34 It is one thing to remain abstinent until age 18 or 20, and quite another to foreswear sex until into one's
thirties or, in the case of persons who do not or legally cannot marry, forever.
35 COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, supra note II, at 21 (quoting WAIT TRAINING, supra note 30, at 199).
36 Id. at 16 (quoting Why kNOw, ABSTINENCE EDUCATION CURRICULUM 112 (2004».
37 [d. at 16.
38
Because sex education has become a political battlefield in the United States, some of the more valueladen messages in sex education policy and curricula are expressed with circumspection. Sex education
conservatives say they are seeking a return to the teaching of "traditional values." Of course, many traditional
values-such as personal responsibility, interpersonal and self-respect, honesty and self-discipline, and even
the wonder of adult sex in appropriate circumstances-are widely shared, uncontroversial, and appropriately
taught in sex education courses. But in debates over sex education. "traditional values" also refers to a very
controversial insistence on traditional gender roles. LUKER, supra note 8, at 227-28.
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over sex education, Sharon Lerner observed a pattern that shows sex-based
double standards writ large and institutionally reinforced: The girls
disproportionately enroll (or are enrolled by their parents) in abstinence-only
curricula, while boys disproportionately are enrolled in the comprehensive
classes. 39 Under such self-imposed "tracking," it is girls especially whom
abstinence-only curricula protect from the "corrupting" force of information
about sex, whereas boys are not thought to need such protection. Boys are put
in charge of the facts, including information about birth control and abortion.
Girls, disproportionately enrolled in the abstinence-only curricula, remain illinformed as they learn only the importance of abstinence until marriage, with
no backup plan. They are groomed for their role as sexual gatekeepers and
guardians of their own (more important) sexual chastity, even as, compared to
their peers who receive a comprehensive sex education, they are left more
vulnerable to unintended pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. 4o
Many abstinence-only curricula were designed and are strongly supported
by religious and conservative groups such as Focus on the Family and
Concerned Women for America (CWA).41 These curricula's views of sex,
sexuality, and sex roles closely track the priorities of such supporting
organizations. CW A, a powerful abstinence-only proponent, consistently
expresses support for "motherhood." CW A's advocacy exploits a useful
ambiguity in the meaning of that word, referring both to the unassailable fact
that women who bear children are mothers and to the traditional, sex-based
assignment of women to the social role of primary family caregiver-a role
that CW A particularly champions.
For example, CWA opposes the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDA W) because it is based on a conviction that, as CW A protests, "a
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society
and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between men and

Lerner, supra note 8.
On the correlation between abstinence curricula or pledges and risky behavior, see generally Hannah
Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the Promise: The STD Consequences of Adolescelll Virginity Pledges, 36 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271, 277 (2005); DOUGLAS KIRBY, NAT'L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY,
SUMMARY: EMERGING ANSWERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEEN PREGNANCY 18
(2001), http://www.teenpregnancy .org/resources/data/pdf/emerans wsum. pdf.
41 See, e.g., Eva Arlia, Concerned Women for America, Abstinence Education's Amazing Progress (Nov.
24, 2004), http://www.cwfa.org/articles/6919/BLl/commentary/index.htm; Linda Klepaki, Focus on the
Family, Sex Education: Article Overview, http://www.family.org/socialissues/AOOO000360.cfm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2007).
39

40
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women.,,42 CWA decries the Convention's requirement that signatory nations
"modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices ... based ... on stereotyped
roles for men and women.,,43 CWA\s explicit in its opposition to such change,
and in its commitment to win official support for maintenance of sexstereotyped roles and behavior.
In sum, overt teachings and the pervasive subtext of abstinence-only
curricula reflect the expectation that women should and will become mothers,
rely on their husbands for financial support, care about their relationships with
males more than the males do, have a greater stake in and identification with
chastity than men, and do not value the importance of sexual release as highly
as men do. By promulgating sexual double standards, those curricula foster a
world view and behavior at odds with our equal protection law. Their
prescriptions for women and men resonate vividly with the traditional sex roles
that were the targets of so many of the early sex equality cases. 44
If it is contrary to equal protection to make even formally neutral
governmental decisions based on sex stereotypes, it would seem, a fortiori,
unconstitutional to teach those same views in public schools. There is,
however, some doctrinal question whether teaching sex stereotypes is
unconstitutional in the absence of an additional exclusion or denial of
opportunity based on those stereotypes. If government must not act on the
42 Wendy Wright, CEDA W: A Global Tool That Would Harm Women (Aug. 27, 2002),
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=1871 &department=CW A&categoryid=nation (quoting Convention
to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13).
43 Id. (quoting CEDAW, supra note 42, at art. 5) (alteration in the original). An online feature on the
Focus on the Family web site, another influential proponent of abstinence-only curricula, similarly asserts, for
example, that men "are providers," care more about respect than about love, and "want more sex." Shaunti
Feldhahn, What I Didn't Know About Men, http://www.family.org/marriage/AOOOOO0997.cfm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2007). Understanding how the sexes differ, the feature claims, allows a woman to "better appreciate
and support [her husband) in the way that he needs." /d. The web site's advice to women that "[m)en care
about appearance," and that "your man does need to see you making the effort to take care of yourself - and he
will take on significant cost or inconvenience in order to support you" sounds uncannily like a recipe for how
to succeed as a 1950s housewife.
44 Stereotypes that women were mothers in charge of farnily care and men were family breadwinners
were the targets in numerous equal protection cases, for example, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,204-07
(1977) (invalidating Social Security Act survivors' benefits scheme paying earnings of a deceased husband to
his widow regardless of dependency, but paying earnings of a deceased wife to her widower only if he proved
he was receiving at least half of his support from her); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-45 (1975)
(invalidating Social Security Act law granting survivors' benefits to both widow and minor children of male
wage earner but granting such benefits only to minor children and not widower of female wage earner); and
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-16 (1975) (invalidating law setting differential ages of majority for girls
and boys based on assumption that boys' professional futures require longer preparation than girls').
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belief that men are aggressive and thus better fit than women for military-style
education,45 women are better mothers,46 or boys are more likely than girls to
drink and drive dangerously,47 then it should follow that government may not
seek to indoctrinate students with those same sex-based generalizations.
Legal protection against sex discrimination is centrally concerned with
stigmatic harms-ideological and cultural ideas even apart from concrete acts
of denial or exclusion. 48 In the context of racial discrimination, too, the
Supreme Court has long underscored the centrality of stigma as an ingredient
of the unconstitutionality of policies in areas ranging from education, to juror
49
participation, to voting rights. Under the race cases, government can no more
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-45 (1996).
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 389 (1979). The Court's decision in Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), is not to the contrary. See
Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. LJ. 835 (2002) (arguing that Nguyen's tolerance of stereotypes about maternal versus paternal ties
evidences immigration and nationality concerns).
47 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 2()()"{)4 (1976).
48 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the
"stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of
one's race or sex," such that "whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex
as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual"); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
625 (1984 ) (defining the "serious social and personal harms" of "discrimination based on archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes," which "forces individuals to labor
under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual abilities" and "thereby both deprive[]
persons of their individual dignity and den[y] society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic,
and cultural life"); Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (determining that "the right to equal
treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not coextensive with any substantive rights to the benefits denied
the party discriminated against," but that "discrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy
participants in the political community, ... can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons who are
personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group"); Mary Anne
Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 765, 785-86 (2002) (opining that
it would be constitutionally problematic for a governmental entity to make a pronouncement of sex inequality
even if it were "unmoored from direct, binding connection to policy," such as by declaring "Welcome to Cobb
County, Where a Woman's Place Is in the Home"); see also David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender,
90 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1009 (2002) (describing gender as a form of ideology that government is obligated to
disestablish by "neither endors[ing] nor disapprov(ing] gender beliefs").
49 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980, 985 (1996) (declaring that "[o]ur Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and
reinforcement of racial stereotypes" and condemning as "constitutional harm" the racially stereotyping
"message" communicated by "the bizarre shape and noncompactness demonstrated by the districts here"); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (observing that "[c]lassifications based on race
carry a danger of stigmatic harm" and "may only reinforce common stereotypes"); Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rei. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 609 (1982) ("state interest in securing residents from the
harmful effects of discrimination" extends "beyond mere physical interests to economic and commercial
interests" to encompass "political, social, and moral damage"); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race,
45

46
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proclaim white supremacy than it can act on racist views to deny concrete
opportunities; a similar bar should be recognized against official sex
stereotyping.
To some extent, the terms of judicial intervention to remedy stigmatic harm
have been analyzed through the standing doctrine, where standing to challenge
policies that communicate racial inferiority has been broadly construed. 50
Even a lack of standing to challenge a stereotyping harm in court would not,
however, vitiate the unconstitutionality of government espousing sex-biased
views on which it is prohibited from acting. 51 In the final analysis, equality
norms should require the adoption of a counter-stereotyping approach to sex
education even if those norms are not always judicially enforceable.
The equal protection critique of abstinence-only curricula is strengthened
and rendered more amenable to judicial resolution by the fact that sex
education classes are designed not only to expose students to ideas, but also to
shape student behavior. Obligatory education permeated with discriminatory
content alone raises serious constitutional concerns. 52 But the conduct-shaping
purpose of sex education curricula makes them vulnerable to equal protection
challenge even if communicating retrogressive sex roles in traditional
academic classes might not be.
One still might object substantively that it is idealistic blindness to apply
antistereotyping principles to sex education. Whether or not the fear of sexual
danger so present in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma supported the
sex-specific statute in that case, sex can indeed be dangerous, and its potential

Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 803, 865 & n. 314 (2004) (concluding that "[i]n the yeats
since the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the Court has plainly concluded that the harms imposed by
racial stigma lie at the core of the problems of inequality the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
address"); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431,444 ("Racism is both 100% speech and 100% conduct. Discriminatory conduct is not racist
unless it also conveys the message of white supremacy-unless it is interpreted within the culture to advance
the structure and ideology of white supremacy.").
50 See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738-40 (stigmatic, noneconomic injury sufficed to support standing);
Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)
(expressly unequal, race-based policy constitutes injury-in-fact for standing purposes, even without denial of a
concrete benefit).
51 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217-21 (1978).
52 The Court in Brown observed that education "is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). A decisive part of what made denial of
access to integrated schools so harmful in Brown was the intangible but culturally very real message of racial
inferiority. Id. at 494-95.
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are deeply gendered. The risks of unwanted pregnancy, disease, sexual
exploitation, and rape do fall disproportionately on women. The instinct to
warn young women against male predation does not strike all parents as
necessarily wrong. It has been powerfully argued, most notably by Catherine
MacKinnon, that sex and sexuality are central to the politics of women's
subordination. 53 Experience and theory thus have taught us that sex equality
law must be responsive to the needs of women faced with many forms of
current, real, gendered harms that are relevant to sex education curricula.
Even as it accounts for real sex characteristics and sexual harms, however,
the law of sex equality is also aspirational, seeking to promote equality in part
by treating us as the equals that we are. 54 Those dual responsive and
aspirational aspects of equal protection are especially highlighted by the sex
education example. Because young people are involved, our desire to equip
them to fend off real harms in a gender-scarred world is intensified, even while
we pin ambitious hopes on them to exemplify egalitarian ideals. Properly
understood, equal protection is indeed idealistic, but it need not be blindly so.
Egalitarian sex education should recognize the realities of sex-based
subordination and harm even while it strongly counters sex-based stereotypes
and double standards. It should acknowledge and oppose male-on-female
aggression and the larger system of gender hierarchy that such aggression
exemplifies and sustains. It should also, however, recognize that boys and
men, too, are frequently harmed by sexual aggression, and that girls and
women can be the moving force behind irresponsible or otherwise harmful
sex. 55 And it should always--especially as applied to young people--express
hope that old patterns will change.
See. e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 9; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2001).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148~9 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
"[ w]e know that like race, gender matters" and that "one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in
certain cases a [juror's] gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case," but
nonetheless insisting that equal protection forbids sex-based generalizations in juror selection as "a statement
about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(\ 984) (acknowledging that "it would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist"
and that "[t]here is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of
pressures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin," but
nonetheless concluding that "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict" are not
"permissible considerations" for custody placement).
55 Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,44 (2004) (noting that "queer
theorists [cannot] seriously deny the existence and pervasiveness of sexual violation: of women by men, men
by men, women by women, and sometimes, by women of men"); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (recognizing that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition covers male-on-male sexual
harassment); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 488 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
53

54
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Teaching sex stereotypes may actually leave students more vulnerable.
Reflexive, blanket assumptions about where we will find sexual aggression or
vulnerability may obscure where real dangers lie. Painting all males with the
brush of sexual brutishness both naturalizes the wrong done by the rapist and
obscures the good of the non-aggressor. Sex-based double standards also
encourage female sexual passivity, lack of agency, and a culture of sexual
objectification of women that neither protects women from unwanted sex nor
advances their ability to find fulfillment in wanted sex. 56 The teaching of
female passivity encourages women not only to deny their own desires, but
also to deny their lack of desire. Consensual but unwanted sex is not rape, but
can be harmful to those who submit to it. 57 The current and future well-being
of our children is better served by factually informative, counter-stereotyping
sex education, which emphasizes equal concern for the emotional and physical
vulnerability of males and females, equal valuation of each person's pleasure
and fulfillment, and an ethic of equal responsibility on the part of both sexes
for self and others.
Sex education must contend with a legacy of official rationalizations for
inequality in terms of "natural" sex differences. The vast web of sex-based
hierarchy has been spun off of a kernel of anatomical sex difference. We once
accepted educational exclusions premised on fears that women's reproductive
organs would be harmed by academic exertion,58 employment exclusions
claimed necessary to protect women's chastity,59 and exclusions from political
life defended in terms of fears that women mixing in public meetings with men
would lead to illegitimate offspring or other grim effects. 6o Against that

dissenting) (critiquing California statute's failure to cover mature woman's seduction of "young and naIve"
boys); Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual Abuse, 88 MARQ, L
REV. 751, 786-87 (2005) (acknowledging the reality, however rare, of female-on-male sexual abuse).
56 See Fine, supra note 24, at 42 (advocating that public education include a discourse of female sexual
desire and noting that, currently, "[p]ublic education's concern for the female victim is revealed as deceptively
thin when real victims are discredited, and when nonvictimizing pleasures are silenced").
57 See Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX 263--{58 (Alan Soble ed.,
3d ed. 1997).
58 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 & n.9 (1996); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15
(1975); EDWARD CLARKE, SEX AND EDUCATION: OR A FAIR CHANCE FOR GIRLS (1873) (offering dire
predictions of results of educating girls and asserting that women developed problems with their "female
organs" as a result of their failures to accept their limitations).
59 E.g., Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
60 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 n.5 (noting concern about "depravation of morals and ambiguity of issue,"
articulated as justification to keep women out of public meetings) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5 1816), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45, 46, n.1 (Paul L Ford ed.,
1899».
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decidedly nonneutral historical backdrop, government's obligation to maintain
neutrality with respect to gender roles might include an affirmative obligation
on the part of public school curricula and teachers not only to refrain from
propagating, but also to contradict, persistent sex-role stereotypes and double
standards.
Sex education can be egalitarian without ignoring the realities of sex
inequality. Teaching about sex-based discrimination, identifying historical
patterns, and observing general trends is not the same thing as endorsing them.
For equal protection purposes, as under the religion clauses, the constitutional
line should be drawn between descriptive teaching, and prescriptive or
normative advocacy of sexual double standards. 6l
The line between
description and advocacy may not always be easy to draw in practice because a
teacher's discussion of the status quo can readily be taken as an affirmation of
it. Mere descriptions of "the way most women (or men) are" may be
statistically correct and descriptively accurate, but they are also at the heart of
sex discrimination. The surest way to safeguard against the elision of
descriptive and normative views of sex difference is to point it out.
To teach about sex, gender, and sexuality in a way that counters rather than
reinforces stereotypes, egalitarian sex education curricula should explain what
is wrong with sex-based generalizations when so much of what we see and
know seems to confirm them. Antistereotyping doctrine acknowledges that
there are many observable, statistically "real" differences between women and
men--differences on points like aggressiveness, confidence, sensitivity, or
cooperativeness. It also acknowledges the reality that males and females may
face significantly different social consequences from the same behaviors, like
chastity or promiscuity. Antistereotyping law nonetheless resists sex-based
generalizations for good reasons, which teachers can convey.62
Egalitarian sex education should communicate relevant ethics and concerns
to both sexes. It should affirm the value of sexual pleasure for females as well

61 See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 607 (1987) (striking down state law requiring
teaching of creationism, but acknowledging that "[c]ourses in comparative religion of course are customary
and constitutionally appropriate" and that "a familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to
understand many historical as well as contemporary events"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking
down law authorizing moment of silence for prayer in school); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686-87
(1971) (permitting public aid to colleges that "covered a range of human religious experiences and are not
limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion," which "made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to
proselytize").
62 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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as males, and the vulnerability of males as well as females to emotional and
physical harm. It should alert girls as well as boys that the power of sexual
desire can test our rationality and emphasize that we are all nonetheless
obligated-and are expected to learn-to exercise self-control. Egalitarian sex
education should teach students of both sexes that parenthood imposes
enormous responsibilities, which should be shared by both women and men.
Evenhanded teaching about abstinence and contraception would stress that
those behaviors are the responsibility of both sexes. Those messages can be
taught consistently with a focus in sex education on preventing harm to youth
by, for example, discouraging teens of both sexes from having sex; any
abstinence message must, however, eschew sex-based double standards. 63
In sum, retrogressive gender ideology, prescribing chastity and maternity
for women while assuming lustfulness and autonomy for men, is at the heart of
today's abstinence-only education movement. In that regard, the abstinenceonly approach conflicts with the substantive norms of both equal protection
and reproductive justice. Egalitarian sex education, in contrast, uses the
teachings of constitutional antistereotyping doctrine to promote gender
equality in a context in which it has important ramifications for avoiding
unwanted pregnancies, promoting procreative responsibility, and enhancing the
sexual agency and sex equality that reproductive rights are about. Boys will be
less likely to engage in unwelcome and irresponsible sex or to spawn unwanted
offspring if they are affirmatively taught to respect girls as equals, discouraged
from linking their masculinity and power to sexual conquest, and taught to be
caregivers responsible for and not threatened by intimate connection with
children. Girls will be less likely to be victimized by unwanted sex or to face
unintended pregnancy if their desire or its lack is deemed to be as important as
men's, they feel empowered to act as sexual agents, and they have
opportunities beyond motherhood to which they realistically can aspire.
Counter-stereotyping sex education thus advances the interconnected goals of
reproductive freedom and sex equality.
63 I do not here take a position on the abstinence message itself, beyond arguing that it must not be
embedded with sexual stereotypes or discriminatorily applied to women and not men. Inequality, not sex, is
the harm I am addressing. Just as some believe that abstinence is best, other families or communities condone
responsible sexual activity among older teens. It thus seems plausible that some schools or school boards
might elect not particularly to promote abstinence, but to emphasize sexual safety and responsibility instead.
Ruth Colker argues, for example, that it is not teen sex or even teenage parenthood as such that is individually
and socially harmful, but that teenage pregnancy "becomes problematic because of the inadequate social
resources devoted to facilitating the pregnancy" and the ensuing family's well-being. Ruth Colker, An Equal
Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender. Race. Age. and Class, 199 I DUKE
L.J. 324, 329-30; see also infra Part III.

HeinOnline -- 56 Emory L.J. 962 2006-2007

2007]

OUR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES

963

II. CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY: THE EQUALITY RIGHT TO A VOID OR POSTPONE
MOTHERHOOD

Sex equality law also has a vital role to play in assuring that women and
men have access to reliable and affordable birth control. For both supporters
and opponents of abortion rights, avoidance of unwanted pregnancy is
preferable to termination of pregnancy through abortion. Compared to
abortion, contraception is generally safer, easier on women's bodies, more
private,64 less expensive, and draws fewer religious or moral objections. The
antiabortion movement decries abortion as if it were a mere "convenience" for
people too irresponsible to plan ahead, and it finds licentiousness in the notion
of "abortion on demand.,,65 Abortion should not be used as just another form
of contraception, they argue. The implication is that people unwilling to parent
a child or offer it for adoption should use birth control. 66
Despite widespread support for contraceptive use, our public policy and
law regarding contraceptive equity contributes to the failures of millions of
sexually active people to use contraception when they do not want children. 67

64 Abortion is protected by what is often characterized as a privacy right, but as a practical matter, the
need to involve medical personnel and often one's parents in an abortion, and to have the procedure done in a
clinic or hospital, make it a much less private procedure than a woman's use in her own home of birth control
drugs or devices, like pills or a diaphragm.
65 See. e.g., Robert H. Bork, Inconvenient Lives, 68 FIRST THINGS 9, 11-I3 (1996).
66 Some opponents of abortion believe that nonprocreative sex (and thus contraception) is acceptable
only within marriage. Others believe that intercourse should be reserved for reproduction alone, and oppose
contraception even within marriage on grounds that interference with a fertilized egg, as by the IUD or the
birth control pill, ends a human life. See, e.g., Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on
the Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968), in 13 THE POPE SPEAKS 329-46 (1969). Nonetheless, far fewer people
object to contraception than oppose abortion; I do not here engage the views of contraception opponents, but
take as a starting point that the right to use contraception is constitutionally protected, whether the person
seeking to use it is married or single, mature or young. See generally Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S.
678,693,697-99 (1977) (contraceptive rights of persons under age 16); Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453-55 (1972) (contraceptive rights of unmarrieds); Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(articulating contraceptive rights of married persons). In recognizing the due process right to gay sex in
Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003), the Supreme Court also reaffirmed the value of and
constitutional right to nonprocreative sex more generally. As noted above, it may be appropriate for public
school teachers in sex education courses to encourage youth to abstain from sex. Government cannot
constitutionally require or assume, however, that adults will abstain from sex, including intercourse, with other
consenting adults, nor can it penalize those who fail to abstain.
67 "More than 40 years after the contraceptive revolution began with the approval of the contraceptive
pill, the United States lags far behind its social and economic counterparts when it comes to effectively
reducing the burdens of unintended pregnancy and of sexually transmitted infections (STls) and related
fertility problems."
ALAN GUITMACHER INST., THE UNANISHED REVOLUTION IN CONTRACEPTION:
CONVENIENCE, CONSUMER ACCESS, AND CHOICE 3 (2003), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2004/09120/
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Contraceptive shortfalls, in tum, arise in part from reference to male health
needs as the baseline for health care and insurance coverage, including
coverage of contraception. 68 Equally meeting women's health needs, whether
they are the same as men's or distinctive as they often are in the area of
reproductive health, is a critical aspect of treating women as equal human
beings. Proponents and opponents of abortion rights alike, if they are
committed to sex equality, should join forces in supporting full and equal
access to contraception for women and men.
The lack of a national requirement that insurance plans cover women's
contraceptives is emblematic of a much broader failure to make contraceptive
access a priority to reduce the extremely high numbers of unintended
pregnancies in the United States. The contraceptive equity issue as it relates to
health insurance plans is just one facet of a larger set of sex inequalities in the
area of reproductive health. It presents an opportunity to uncover a partly
submerged and critically important theoretical rift in our understandings of
reproductive health and sex equality more generally, and helps point the way to
more sound approaches to both.
On one side of the rift is the Court's approach to constitutional equality law
that refuses to treat discrimination based on pregnancy as sex-based
discrimination. That theory calls for equality of the sexes only insofar as
women are nonreproducing persons. According to that theory, insofar as
women and men are not similarly situated with respect to pregnancy, they need
not be treated equally.
This theory has its most prominent legal statement in Geduldig v. Aiello,69
which held that denial of disability benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities
while providing coverage for other, similarly disabling conditions did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 7o Geduldig reasoned that the challenged
disability policy discriminated, not between women and men, but between
pregnant and nonpregnant persons (the latter group including both females and
males).71 The Court thus eschewed the heightened scrutiny required of sexbased distinctions in favor of rational-basis review and upheld the exclusion
based on the state's interest in fiscal integrity. In General Electric Co. v.
UnfinRevlnContra.pdf. Opposition by social conservatives has decreased funding for contraceptive health
and, consequently, women's access to contraceptives. Id. at 9.
68 See Colker, supra note 63, at 344--46 (noting that the baseline also is implicitly white and wealthy).
69 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
70 Id. at 494-95.
71 Id. at 496 n.20.
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Gilbert,n the Court promptly extended that constitutional theory of equality to
its interpretation of Title VII.73
A second theory, reflected in federal statutory equality mandates, views sex
equality as also applicable to reproducing persons.
It understands
discrimination based on pregnancy or other aspects of women's reproductive
capacity as discrimination based on sex, requiring that women's pregnancy or
contraceptive needs be treated as favorably as other, analogous conditions that
also affect men. This view of sex equality understands that pregnancy and
related conditions are often used as proxies for femaleness and excuses for sex
discrimination. It thus carefully scrutinizes distinctions based on reproductive
capacity or role as likely sites of unequal treatment.
This second theory is exemplified by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA), a 1978 amendment to Title VII that overruled Gilbert to define
discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions"-such as the ability to become pregnant-as prohibited sex
discrimination. 74 As a practical matter, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
rendered Geduldig's reasoning all but a dead letter (at least in the employment
context) for thirty years. 75 A law that targets women's distinctive reproductive
capacity or conduct is, under Title VII, a law aimed at women because of their
sex. It is therefore unlawful to provide unequal employment opportunities or
fringe benefits to women and men, even when the difference is based on
demonstrated sex distinctions like pregnancy or the capacity to become
pregnant. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the difference in
women's reproductive anatomy does not justify exclusion of fertile women
from jobs involving lead exposure with potential harmful consequences to
fertility or fetal development. 76
The second theory has found straightforward application in the context of
contraceptive access. Health insurance plans that deny contraceptive coverage
usually cover all other drugs or devices, even those not required for an illness

72 429 U.s. 125 (1976).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
74 § 2000e(k) (2000).
75 Geduldig has not been wholly devoid of doctrinal force. For example, the Court in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,271-73 (1993), invoked Geduldig in refusing to apply to abortion clinic
blockades a federal law prohibiting conspiracies motivated by "class animus" (e.g., race, sex). See 42 U.S.c.
§ 1985(3). The blockades were not targeted at women based on sex, the Court reasoned, because women were
not only among those seeking abortions, but also among those objecting. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270.
76 United Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,200 (1991).
73
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or abnonnal condition. They provide coverage for purely preventative care
(e.g., vaccinations, medications to maintain healthy blood pressure or
cholesterol level), for drugs and devices needed due to voluntary "lifestyle
choices" (e.g., weight-loss drugs and drugs and devices relating to alcohol
abuse or smoking cessation), and even drugs, like Viagra, that facilitate
intercourse for men. Under these plans, anyone who needs Anabuse to help
with a drinking problem, or Lipitor to reduce cholesterol levels, or Viagra to
enhance sexual performance, is entitled to see a doctor and have medication
prescribed. However, a woman who wants contraception so that she can enjoy
sex and prevent pregnancy must pay for a doctor visit to obtain a prescription,
and then she must pay for the contraception itself.77
Such policies' contraceptive exclusion does not directly affect covered men
because condoms require no prescription or doctor's fitting. Subscribers pay
out of pocket for condoms just as members of both sexes pay for any other
over-the-counter drug or device. Condoms are inexpensive and widely
available nationwide, around the clock, in urban and rural areas alike. They
can be picked up at convenience stores, drugstores, grocers, vending machines
in men's restrooms, and even from bowls at clinics, parties, and clubs.
Contraceptives used by women-including birth control pills, intrauterine
devices, diaphragms, Implanon (subcutaneous implants), and emergency
contraceptive pills for young women-require a doctor's prescription, yet are
carved out for explicit exclusion from some otherwise comprehensive
prescription benefit plans. 78
77 A recent study reports that 46% of women pay $15 for each month's supply of oral contraceptives, and
that out-of-pocket expenses and dispensing restrictions inhibit access to contraception.
See ALAN
GUTIMACHER INST., supra note 67, at 9. The average cost of a physician's visit for contraceptive prescription
is approximately $85, and women taking the pill (the method used by over 30% of women using any method
of birth control) typically visit their doctors once a year for prescription refills. Holly Mead, Making Birth
Control More Accessible to Women: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Over-the-Counter Oral Contraceptives,
BRIEFING PAPER (Inst. for Women's Policy Research, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2001, at 3,
http://www.iwpr.org!pdf/otc0201.pdf. 14.4% of women in the United States lack health insurance altogether
(including Medicaid) and thus lack contraceptive as well as other routine health care coverage. HEALTH RES.
& SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WOMEN'S HEALTH USA 2005, at 64 (2005),
http://mchb.hrsa.gov/whusa_051_pdf/whusa2005.pdf. These women--disproportionately poor, young,
minority and immigrant-must also pay the out-of pocket charges for contraceptive health care or find a clinic
that offers subsidized contraceptive health services. See generally ALAN GUTIMACHER INST., FuLFILLING THE
PROMISE: PUBLIC POLICY AND U.S. FAMILY PLANNING CLINICS 16 (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org!pubsl
fulfill.pdf.
78 After this Symposium was held in the spring of 2006, the FDA approved emergency contraception for
over-the-counter sales to adults. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Over-the-Counter
Access for Plan B for Women 18 and Older Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under (Aug. 24,
2006), http://www.fda.govlbbs/topicsINEWS/2006INEWOI436.html. Approval of over-the-counter sales of
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Failure of otherwise comprehensive insurance plans to cover prescription
contraceptives is a significant form of sex discrimination. Such discrimination
has become especially vivid in light of the development and widespread
prescription of Viagra for men. Otherwise-comprehensive prescription benefit
plans treat male enjoyment of sex with the aid of Viagra (without the condition
that it be for procreation) as a shared concern warranting insurance coverage,
while treating women's ability to enjoy sex without risk of unwanted
pregnancy as a personal issue to be addressed out of the woman's own
pocketbook. (Condom use, needless to say, does not adequately protect
women as it is not wholly within their control). Those policies, like the
abstinence-only curricula discussed in Part I, track some of the most ingrained
sex stereotypes---defining men in terms of potency, sexuality and otherwise,
and women in terms of motherhood, even when they would not choose it. 79
In recognition of the inequity of contraceptive exclusions, more than
twenty states have enacted contraceptive equity laws, reinforcing and
expanding on the PDA's approach, specifically requiring health insurance
plans regulated by state law to cover contraception. 80 Where state law does
not require such coverage, sex discrimination lawsuits have established an
entitlement to contraceptive equity under Title VII, as a handful of courts and
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have held that
emergency contraception was a positive development in terms of the equality and reproductive rights argument
advanced here. Emergency contraception (nonprescription) is now more readily available to adult women than
contraception used before and during intercourse, such as the pill, diaphragm, or IUD (which still require
prescriptions).
79 To the extent that exclusion of contraception from otherwise comprehensive health plans implies that
contraception is something other than a health need, the implication is flatly counterfactual. Childbearing may
be natural, healthy, and, ideally, joyful, but so, for example, are maturation and ageing, yet neither comes
without health implications. There is no question that before the widespread availability of contraception, the
bearing of large numbers of children was an enormous burden on women's health and was a leading cause of
maternal death. Achievemellts in Public Health, 1900-1999: Healthier Mothers and Babies, 48 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 849 (1999). Even now, when the average number of children per woman in the
United States hovers around 2.1 births per woman, a woman who uses contraceptives is exposed to less health
risk than a woman who undergoes childbirth. See, JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at I (2005), http://www.census.
gov/prod/2005pubs/p20-555.pdf; CICELY MARSON & JOHN CLELAND, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE EFFECTS OF
CONTRACEPTION ON OBSTETRIC OUTCOMES 5 (2004), http://www.who.intlreproductive-healthlpublications/
2004/effects_contraception/text.pdf; Ushma D. Upadhyay & Bryant Robey, Why Family Planning Matters,
POPULATION REP., July 1999, at I, available at http://www.infoforhealth.org!pr/j49/j49.pdf.
80 ALAN
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF AS OF JANUARY I, 2006,
http://www.guttmacher.org!statecenterlspibs/spib_ICC.pdf (reporting that 26 states require that insurers
covering prescriptions drugs in general also cover the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and
devices); NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LAWS IN YOUR STATE: KNow YOUR RIGHTSUSE YOUR RIGHTS I (2003), http://www.nw1c.org!pdf/concovstateguide2003.pdf.
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employers that offer otherwise comprehensive insurance coverage of drugs and
devices must also cover birth control. 81 Just as women cannot be discharged or
otherwise disadvantaged at work because they use (or do not use)
contraceptives, they cannot be denied coverage of contraceptives under an
employer-sponsored health plan that provides benefits for comparable drugs
and devices. 82 The PDA, the EEOC's decision explained, was enacted to
"ensure that women would not be disadvantaged in the workplace either
because of their pregnancies or because of their ability to have children.,,83
The PDA approach is thus the prevalent one, and most insured women in the
United States do have contraceptive coverage. 84
Geduldig's narrower understanding of sex discrimination is nonetheless a
crack in the foundation of contemporary equality law. Geduldig's destructive
potential is hinted at by a recent contraceptive equity case, Cummins v.
Illinois. 85 The district court in Cummins broke from the trend in favor of
contraceptive equity to sustain Illinois's exclusion of prescription
contraception against a sex discrimination challenge. 86 Although Title VII
would seem to forbid that result, the judge in Cummins relied on a version of
Geduldig's reasoning: "non-surgical control of fertility is excluded equally to
81 See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that
"as prescription contraceptives are only available to women, the exclusion is not gender neutral because it only
burdens female employees"); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co .. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(requiring contraceptive coverage under Title VII, noting that "mere facial parity of coverage does not excuse
or justify an exclusion which carves out benefits that are uniquely designed for women"); U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html[hereinafter EEOC Decision] (opining that even
though the plan at issue did not explicitly distinguish between men and women, prescription contraceptives are
available only for women and the plan's exclusion of them was thus sex based). As this issue went to press, a
divided Eighth Circuit panel in In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Lit., 479 F.3d 936 (2007),
sustained a health plan's exclusion of prescription contraception, reasoning that contraception is not "related
to" pregnancy within the terms of the PDA, and that its exclusion is not sex discrimination under Title VII
because the plan equally excludes women's and men's contraception. The decision seems quite clearly wrong,
as its PDA analysis contravenes that statute's terms and purpose to cover pre-pregnancy reproductive health,
see Johnson Controls, 449 U.S. at 200, and its Title VII analysis improperly failed to find sex inequality in
plans not equally comprehensive as to women and men. The decision should add impetus to current efforts to
enact federal contraceptive equity legislation.
82 EEOC Decision, supra note 81, at 2.
83 Id.
84 ALAN GlITTMACHER INST., FACTS IN BRIEF: CONTRACEPTIVE USE 2 (2006) (reporting that "9 in 10
employer-based insurance plans cover a full range of contraceptives, which is 3 times the proportion just a
decade ago").
85 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. 111. Aug. 30, 2005), appeal filed, No. 05-3877 (7th Cir.).
86 In 2003 (effective Jan, 1,2004), Illinois amended its law prospectively to require that insurance plans
include contraception in otherwise comprehensive plans, 215 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/356z.4 (West 2006),
but the Cummins class action remains pending on the plaintiffs' monetary claims for lost benefits.
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both sexes," apparently just as pregnancy disability coverage in Geduldig was
denied equally to all "pregnant persons.,,87 It did not seem to matter to the
court that only women suffered the prescription-contraception exclusion, just
as it did not matter in Geduldig that pregnancy is a condition unique to
women. 88
As of this wntmg, Cummins is on appeal, and the decision may yet be
reversed or the case may be settled out of court. The decision nonetheless
highlights troubling and persistent instability in the law of sex equality. One
aspect of that instability is the apparent gap between the two theories of sex
discrimination identified above. If the Constitution demands equality only for
nonreproducing men and women, can Congress constitutionally require more?
In doctrinal terms, the instability can be reduced to whether Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, is "appropriate legislation," implementing constitutional
equality as the Supreme Court understands it, and thus validly abrogating
sovereign imrnunity.89 The Supreme Court's federalism cases require a theory
2005 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 42634, at *24.
The Cummins court also reasoned, in a puzzling non sequitur, that because women and men both are
involved in procreation, denial of birth control to women equally affects both sexes: While it is true that
"[c]onception is by definition the fertilization of the ovum, which takes place inside a woman's body," the
court wrote, it is not true that
87

88

[h]ealth plans that deny coverage for contraception, by definition, affect only the health of the
women . . .. [T]he process clearly requires the participation of both males and females, and,
critically, the process may therefore be prevented by either the male or the female, each of whom
is consequently equally affected by the exclusion in this case.
ld. at **24-25. Although his reasoning is not entirely clear, it seems that Judge Gilbert is suggesting that
because contraception is a barrier between sperm and ovum, both sexes are equally affected by unavailability
of female contraception as a method to be used when the couple has sex. To the extent that men prefer the pill
over condoms, for example, the exclusion equally deprives the male sex partners of female employees of the
pill as a contracepti ve choice. That view overlooks, however, that it is women, not men, who become
pregnant, that only female contraceptives can prevent pregnancy without regard to men's willingness to
cooperate, and that, presumably for those very reasons, female contraceptives are prescribed towomen, not to
men. If condoms required a prescription and the pill did not, and condoms were excluded from otherwise
comprehensive health insurance, men might have valid sex discrimination claims just as I believe women do in
cases like Cummins. They would have such claims even though, as Judge Gilbert's reasoning suggests,
women, too, have a very strong stake in condom use. Indeed, women's stake in such claims would be
considerably stronger than that of men in Cummins due to the ability of condoms to shield against sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, to which women are disproportionately vulnerable. The other
sex's stake, however, does not remove the inequality of noncoverage of one sex's contraception.
89 It is the Supreme Court's federalism revolution that threatens to revive Geduldig as an obstacle to
women's equality. One of the major lines of Rehnquist Court's federalism cases held that plaintiffs cannot
obtain damages against nonconsenting states under a federal statute (e.g., Title VII) unless they can
demonstrate that the statute is a valid congressional implementation of constitutional guarantees. Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1996); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). The
animating idea is that, under our federalist system, states retain sovereign immunity against damage claims
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of how the PDA implements the judicial understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause, notwithstanding Geduldig.
That theory is suggested by the Court's 2003 decision in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, which sustained a damage claim
against the state under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 90 The Court in
Hibbs specifically noted in dicta that Congress validly abrogated sovereign
91
immunity in enacting Title VII, of which the PDA is a part. The disparatetreatment aspects of Title VII are indisputably appropriate legislative
enforcement of judicially defined equal protection rights, as the substantive
requirement of Title VII simply tracks the strong constitutional presumption
against distinctions motivated by or expressly based on sex.92 A classic
example of unconstitutional sex discrimination that is also pregnancy
discrimination under the PDA is the failure to hire or promote a woman based
on the assumption that, because of her sex, she is more likely than an otherwise
comparable male to leave work once she has children.93 That kind of sex
stereotyping is at the core of what equal protection forbids.

except where Congress has outlawed the state conduct as a "congruent and proportional'" way to protect
constitutional rights. Thus, mere commercial legislation pursuant to Congress's broad Commerce Clause
power cannot overcome state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52-54. Because the post·Civil
War Reconstruction Amendments were enacted to provide constitutional protection against state
discrimination, however, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly confers enforcement power on
Congress, legislation that effectuates equal protection rights may trump state sovereign immunity. The
sovereign immunity defense was not properly raised in Cummins. See Brief for the Nat'l Women's Law Ctr.
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Tana Cummins at 21 n.5, Cummins v. Illinois, No. 05-3877 (7th
Cir. Apr. 3, 2006). But whether there or in other similar cases the issue will be whether Title VII as amended
by the PDA is valid as an implementation of the equal protection guarantee against sex discrimination, even
though the Court in Geduldig held that denial of benefits to "pregnant persons" is not sex discrimination. See
id. at 27; Brief for Appellant at 36-40, Cummins, No. 05-3877. There is room under Section 5 for Congress to
legislate more broadly than a court would rule under Geduldig. The Court has repeatedly insisted that
"[I]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutionaL" Boerne,
521 U.S. at 518; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,518 (2004); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
648-49 (1966). Nonetheless, several important antidiscrimination measures have fallen under the Supreme
Court's Section 5 sword, including provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (see United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000»; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000»; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (see Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 358 (2001».
90 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
91 /d. at 727 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), as having so held).
92 See United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 878 (2006) (concluding that "no one doubts that § 5
grants Congress the power to . . . creat[e] private remedies against the States for actual violations of
[constitutional] provisions'").
93 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730-32.
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To the extent that Title VII exceeds the judicially enforced equal protection
norm by forbidding policies with only pregnancy-related disparate impact,94
Title vn seems also to fall within the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5
power as an appropriate legislative way to prevent and remedy unconstitutional
discrimination. 95 Examples of disparate-impact sex discrimination relating to
pregnancy would be policies depriving employees of seniority on return from
pregnancy disability leave96 or providing no leave to employees of either sex
for conditions like maternity disability or similarly temporary disabling
conditions. 97 Statutory disparate-impact standards can be justified under
Section 5 even though the Court has declined to recognize disparate-impact
claims directly under Section I of the Equal Protection Clause. 98
Authorization of disparate-impact claims specifically relating to
"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" should be easier to
justify as "appropriate" Fourteenth Amendment legislation than Title VII's
authorization of disparate-impact sex discrimination claims more generally.99
Discrimination relating to women's reproductive role is at the heart of sex
inequality. Much of that discrimination-such as employers' bias against
women based on assumptions that women will become pregnant and that those
who do will be less able or reliable workers-is unconstitutional even under
Geduldig. IOO
94 Personal Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (sex-based disparate impact alone does
not violate Section I of the Equal Protection Clause).
95 Disparate impact claims were well established at the time of Fitzpatrick, see Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971), and Fitzpatrick does not suggest that it is limited to disparate-treatment
claims. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. Hibbs rejected the suggestion that a ban on discriminatory leave policies
alone would suffice to prevent unconstitutional sex discrimination, explaining that doing so would allow noleave policies, which would have the effect of excluding more women than men from the workplace. Hibbs
thus affirmed the FMLA as a remedy for such de/acto discrimination, or disparate impact. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at
737-38. Lower courts have sustained Title VII's disparate-impact prong against Section 5 challenges. See,
e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626-27 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Employment Discrimination Litig.,
198 F.3d 1305, 1316-24 (II th Cir. 1999).
96 Nashville Gas Co. v. Salty, 434 U.S. 136,139-40 (1977).
97 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-38.
98 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,652-53 (1966).
99 It remains somewhat unclear the extent to which the constitutionality of a federal law under Section 5
is subject to piecemeal analysis. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (sustaining Title II of
Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to claims involving fundamental right of access to courts); id. at
551 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (expressing "grave doubts" about use of as-applied analysis in Section 5
context); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321, 1356-59 (2000) (finding ambiguity in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Saving Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), as to whether Section 5 challenges are necessarily facial or may be
as applied).
100 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730--32.
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Given the apparent validity under Section 5 of the legislative response to
Geduldig, the continuing coexistence of the two theories of sex discrimination
may have little immediate practical consequence. Strategically, perhaps the
best approach is simply to continue to minimize the significance of Geduldig
and the desiccated theory of sex discrimination it stands for, and advocate, on a
piecemeal basis, for additional measures to break down reproduction-related
sex hierarchies. The Supreme Court in Hibbs has already expressly cabined
Geduldig, making clear that "where regulation of pregnant women rests on
sex-role stereotypes, it is sex-based state action within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause.,,101 If state and federal legislators have enacted and
will continue to expand protections against reproductive sex discriminationlike the PDA, the FMLA, paid leave, and childcare support-there is less
practical need to push to overrule Geduldig. There is also the unlikely but very
costly risk that the Supreme Court, if given the chance, would reaffirm rather
than limit or overrule Geduldig. Perhaps we should reconcile ourselves to
living in Geduldig's shadow.
Doing so is not, however, without costs. It seems clear that Geduldig is
wrong. 102 Failure to overturn it helps to foster a broader ambivalence about
101 Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871, 1873 (2006). Siegel explains that Geduldig itself was an
expressly narrow opinion in a way that Hibbs has since made clear:

Geduldig holds that "not ... every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sexbased classification like those considered in Reed . .. and Frontiero." It leaves open the
possibility that some legislative classifications concerning pregnancy are sex-based
classifications like those considered in Reed and Frontiero. And Hibbs provides examples of
legislative classifications concerning pregnancy (e.g., statutes that grant "maternity" leave and
"pregnancy disability" leave) that the Court holds are "gender-discriminatory" and rest on
"the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women's work."
Id. at 1891-92 (citing Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731).
102 The scholarly consensus is strongly critical of Geduldig; indeed, it is difficult to find scholars
supporting the decision. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 758-59 (2006) (stating
that "it is hard to imagine a clearer sex-based distinction" than the one at issue in Geduldig); Dawn Johnsen,
Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 608
(1992) (noting that Geduldig has "been subjected to harsh criticism and even ridicule for [its) assertion that a
distinction directly targeting a biological characteristic that only women possess and thus disadvantaging only
women does not constitute a sex based distinction"); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 268 (1992)
(observing that "[t)he Court's equal protection analysis in Geduldig is by now infamous"); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984) (reporting that criticism of Geduldig
became "a cottage industry," and that even the leading defense of the decision acknowledges that the Court's
failure to treat the state policy as sex based was in error). On the merits, the critics have the better arguments.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Low (With Special Reference to Pornography,
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the meaning and scope of sex equality on core issues relating to the sexes'
reproductive distinctiveness. Women's reproductive capacity stands at the
heart of the construction of women's unequal social, political, and economic
roles, so we cannot hope to achieve sex equality without a theory of equality
that accounts for pregnancy, childbearing, or related conditions. Even
assuming the continued vitality of the PDA, Geduldig's coexistence with the
PDA is a reminder that protection against discrimination based on reproductive
distinctiveness remains an optional matter of legislative policy that Congress
could repeal tomorrow, not a bedrock, constitutional protection that all official
action must respect.
The contraceptive equity cases also point to a second instability in the law
of sex equality. Whether we assume that the bar against discrimination based
on reproductive distinctiveness remains only a statutory guarantee, or that
Geduldig is narrowed or reversed so that the bar is recognized to have
constitutional force, there remains some ambiguity about the nature of the
protection that bar affords. This second instability is less about which kinds of
adverse conduct should be viewed as based on sex than about the meaning of
sex discrimination in the context of reproductive capacity. Specifically, is it
enough to treat men and women the same, without regard to whether the
particular symmetrical treatment offered fails to permit both sexes to
participate in society as equals? Or does women's equal liberty depend on
whether equal treatment assures their ability to control their fertility (through
benefits like health insurance coverage of contraception)?
One way of getting at that question is to examine the sex-based harm of
insurance policies that exclude contraception. Is the discriminatory harm the
meeting of all male health needs while meeting female needs, minus one?
That is plainly a large part of it. The courts that have found discrimination in
Abonion. and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. I, 32 (1992) (arguing that "[a) statute that is explicitly
addressed to women is of course a form of sex discrimination" and that "[a) statute that involves a defining
characteristic or a biological correlate of being female should be treated the same way"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1580, 1584 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that "[t)he proper comparison in Geduldig
... was not between pregnant women and all other nonpregnant workers, but between female employees who
had engaged in reproductive behavior and male workers who had done likewise"); Siegel, supra, at 269-70
(criticizing Geduldig for "ignor[ing) the fact that the capacity to gestate distinguishes the sexes physically ...
and socially: Judgments about women's capacity to bear children playa key role in social definitions of gender
roles and thus in the social logic of 'discrimination based on gender as such"'); see also Mary Becker.
Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 UNIV. OF CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 88 n.339
(contending that the exclusion authorized by Geduldig unrealistically "assumes that the worker with a
pregnancy related disability has some other means of support," when in fact she typically "needs money for
her own survival and the survival of the new citizen dependent on her").
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contraceptive equity cases point to the disjuncture between comprehensive
coverage of drugs and devices needed by men, and incomplete coverage of
drugs and devices needed only (and pervasively) by women. I03 The exclusion
of "contraception" from a list of covered drugs and devices, when that term
refers to something exclusively needed by women, equates the exclusion to
one which expressly says "female contraception is excluded." The latter is
plainly sex based, and the former (really identical) exclusion is, too. To deny it
would be akin to saying that heightened equal protection scrutiny is
inapplicable to a government job announcement saying "candidates with
breasts need not apply"; the excluded category equates to the category of
women, while barely avoiding saying so. That is clearly a form of sex
discrimination, and the contraceptive equity decisions correctly recognized it
as such.
But that does not fully capture the sex discrimination at issue here.
Imagine that men's contraception also required a doctor's prescription and that
it was equally expensive and inconvenient for men to see their doctors and get
and fill those prescriptions. If under those circumstances men and women's
contraception were equally excluded from health insurance coverage, would
exclusion no longer be a form of sex discrimination? Under the reasoning just
identified, perhaps it would not be. There may be more, however, to the
contraceptive equity theory.
Part of the inequity in the cases also relates to the fact that it is
contraception, and not some other sex-specific benefit-Viagra, breast
implants, or even treatment for premenstrual syndrome-that is excluded from
the insurance plans. It is not just the denial of coverage for a sex-specific drug
or device that is problematic. The policies are particularly inequitable because
they refuse to cover medical care that empowers women to control their
reproductive capacity. The point of the PDA, according to the EEOC, was not
just to mandate formal equality in the employment and benefits offered to

103 See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979,984 (E.D. Mo. 2003); Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Potential pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical
condition that is sex-related because only women can become pregnant."); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141
F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.O. Wash. 2001) ('The special or increased healthcare needs associated with a
woman's unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the same extent, and on the same terms, as other
healthcare needs"); EEOC Decision, supra note 81 (Exclusion of contraceptive coverage is sex based because
"prescription contraceptives are available only for women. . .. As a result, Respondents' explicit refusal to
offer insurance coverage for them is, by definition, a sex-based exclusion. Because 100 percent of the people
affected by Respondents' policy are members of the same protected group-here, women-Respondent's
policy need not specifically refer to that group in order to be facially discriminatory.").
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women and men, but also to "ensure that women would not be disadvantaged
in the workplace either because of their pregnancies or because of their ability
to have children."I04 That theory of equality IS more robust than the bare,
formal equality discussed above.
That fuller theory of sex equality is not limited to the concern that the
insurance plans cover Viagra and not the pill, or that they deny something for
which only women need a prescription while granting everything for which
men do. That theory also recognizes as a precondition of equality women's
need to control their fertility-a need that is not met by equally denying
contraceptive access to both sexes. For women especially, contraception is
much more than a health need. The economic and emotional burdens of
unintended pregnancy and the ensuing abortion or childbirth, fall heavily and
disproportionately on women. Without access to the means to control and
limit reproduction, the average woman would bear twelve to fifteen children in
her lifetime. 105
A society in which women lack control to plan when they have children is
one in which women must remain second-class citizens. We already know,
and the Court recognized in Hibbs, that many employers assume that to be a
mother is to be a primary caregiver with correspondingly less job commitment
than a man, who is presumed to be an unencumbered "ideal worker."I06 If
impaired access to contraceptives hinders women's ability to exercise choice
about when and whether to have children, it also reinforces broader patterns of
discrimination against women as a class of presumptive breeders rather than
reliable breadwinners and citizens.
Women and men have an equal moral claim (and constitutional right) to
sexual intimacy, yet contraceptive exclusions suggest that women must pay for
that right in ways that men need not. The right to engage in nonprocreative
sex, which the Supreme Court has protected from Griswold v. Connecticut lO7
through Lawrence v. Texas,108 can only be equally assured to women when
EEOC Decision. supra note 81.
Improving Women's Health: Why Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Matters: Hearings on S. 104
Before the S. Comm. on Health. Education, Labor and Pensions, I 07th Congo 38 (200 I) (statement of Jennifer
Erickson, phannacist). The availability of the birth control pill alone accounts for much of the leap in the
proportion of high-powered professional jobs held by women in the United States (from 5% in 1960 to 25% in
1998). LUKER, supra note 8, at 75.
106 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736-37; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICf AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 71-72 (2000).
107 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
108 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
104

105
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they have ready access to safe and effective birth control. Plans that fail to
provide access to contraception on the same terms as other drugs and devices
are inconsistent with women's equal liberty.
In light of maternity's burdens on women, It IS inconsistent with sex
equality for women to be left vulnerable to impregnation against their will,

even as a result of otherwise consensual intercourse. Medical technology
today makes a range of woman-controlled contraceptives feasible and
relatively inexpensive, and women have come to assume that family planning
is part of a healthy and responsible life. Under these circumstances, even
formally equal denial of contraceptive access should be understood as sex
discrimination.
In theoretical terms, the formal-equality approach to
contraceptive access is incomplete without a cultural feminist skepticism of
any implicitly male baseline of contraceptive coverage. A fuller understanding
of equality would require that access extend equally to both sexes. 109
Women's equal freedom of intimate association and liberty to invest in life
plans on equal terms with men-plans for education, employment, or family
that can span years-require that contraception be treated as a routine health
benefit and not excluded from public or private health insurance coverage.
Women cannot participate in society, learn, earn, govern, and thrive equally
without the ability to determine whether and when to become mothers. The
Court's observation in the lead opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, is relevant here, too: "The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.,,11O Women's
ability to prevent unintended pregnancy depends on having access to
contraception that they can control.
In sum, although women are, in the narrow sense of Geduldig, differently
situated from men due to the distinct reproductive capacities of each sex, the
law of sex equality--constitutional as well as statutory-should prohibit
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions. Those
aspects of women's reproductive distinctiveness have historically been a
touchstone of the sex-based division of labor that so much of our equal

109 This is the approach to sex equality accomplished by the reconciliation of the California pregnancy
disability leave provision and Title VB in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra. 479
U.S. 272, 289-91 (1987).
110 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined in relevant
part by Justices Blackmun and Stevens).
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protection law aims to uproot. Discrimination against women as mothers or
potential mothers remains a widespread equal protection and reproductive
freedom problem today, and recognizing equality claims in the reproductive
health area is one step toward addressing that problem.
Put differently, equal protection should not stop at rooting out
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated women and men, but should also
assure that implicitly male norms of the reproductive role are not unreflectively
accepted as the measure of equality, thereby disadvantaging most women.
When a man lacks control of his fertility, he does not typically experience it as
a (negatively) life-shaping event to the extent that a woman ordinarily finds
lack of control of hers. However inequitable and objectionable that may be, it
has long been true and remains so. This argument thus requires not only
equalizing the sexes' health benefits, but also doing so in a way that takes
women's reproductive health needs as a benchmark.
Thus, with respect to reproductive distinctiveness, equality law should
account for the burdens of bearing children and enduring the pervasive sex-role
expectations of motherhood. Legal (and technological and cultural) treatment
of reproductive capacity should permit women and men to participate in
society as equals. As with sex education policy, treatment of contraceptive
access should counteract stereotyped views of women as fated passively to
accept motherhood, like sex, on terms advantageous to men. To that end, full
and equal reproductive health benefits should be viewed as a requisite of sex
equality, to enable all of us, women as well as men, to choose rather than be
consigned to devoting our bodies and lives to the production and nurturance of
. III
the next generatIon.
III. WORK-FAMILY: AN EQUALITY RIGHT TO CARE, WITHOUT THE
FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY

Unwanted pregnancy is not the only reason women seek abortions, and
denial of the right to contraception or abortion is not the only way that
reproductive justice is denied. People who want children, whether or not they
initially intended to get pregnant, often realize they cannot responsibly carry a
III See Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47,61 (1971)(arguing, in
classical liberal terms, that women, like men, should be left free from co-optation of their bodies for the
support of others); EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT
(1996) (drawing an extended analogy between pregnancy and physical assault, from which women are entitled
to defend themselves using deadly force if necessary).
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pregnancy to term.
They may be too poor, immature, or sick to raise a wellcared-for child; they may realize that raising a child would require them to
leave school or lose a job needed to assure their own and their child's or
children's support; or they may face opposition, estrangement, or abuse from a
parent, spouse, or partner. 113 To the extent that sex discrimination intensifies
the victimization or relative powerlessness of mothers, it enhances the need for
abortion. I 14
Figuring out how to respond to those circumstances in a way that promotes
both sex equality and the freedom to choose motherhood has been a complex
and central challenge in both feminist theory and in the controversies over
abortion rights. Crudely put, in feminist theory, cultural feminists have argued
that women's equality requires valuing and supporting women where they are
now-substantially involved in care giving-whereas liberal and dominance
feminists have focused on efforts to move women to situations that provide
greater access to the jobs and political power still dominated by men. Abortion
controversy, too, intensifies over the extent to which the starting point is
accepting maternity, planned or unplanned, or accepting women's entitlement
to autonomy and choice about whether to carry or terminate a pregnancy.
The best responses combine the strengths of the different camps in the
feminist and abortion debates. An overall work-family agenda should be
informed by a cultural feminist recentering of social values-for men as well
as women-toward taking care seriously and providing better public and
private support for it. Work-family policy should also heed dominance
feminism's insistence that economic resources, such as access to the paid labor
market and social welfare benefits, are an indispensable ingredient of women's
equal empowerment. The best work-family approaches adhere as well to
liberal feminism's insistence on official sex-neutrality (e.g., expecting care
from and offering family-friendly benefits to both sexes), and on the potential
112 See Shauna L. Shames & Joan C. Williams, Mothers' Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of
Motherhood, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 818,822 (2004).
113 Id. at 831 (citing Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169,171 (\988)).
114 See generally id. (arguing that women often seek abortions in order to enable them to be better
mothers, either to existing or future children); Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood:
A Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371,381, 390 (\995) (arguing that "abortion is a kind of
mothering decision"); Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. IS, 23
(1992). This Article focuses on sex inequality, but racial inequality, too, is a major limiting force for people
who would want to have children but feel they cannot without plunging themselves and their offspring further
into poverty. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers'
Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. \029, \036-37 (2004).
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and freedom of men and women to defy gender stereotypes (e.g., men
undertaking the burdens and joys of care). Finally, work-family policy could
speak to both the "pro-choice" and "pro-life" agendas by, in all these ways,
offering a genuine choice of parenthood. The long distances yet to be traveled
in these directions mark the great need to protect reproductive rights; they
underscore that we must guard not only women's liberty and privacy rights to
defend women's bodily integrity against unwanted pregnancy, but also
women's equal protection rights against conscription to childbearing and
motherhood-conditions that today remain deeply inequitable.
The Supreme Court has not only tentatively recognized the interplay
between reproductive rights and sex equality, but also acknowledged the
particular salience to inequality of women's care-giving roles. The Court in
Hibbs viewed widespread employment discrimination against women,
stereotyped as caregivers, as evidence to support policy aimed at the
reconciliation of work and family obligations. I 15 Hibbs also helped parents
who are-and are not just stereotyped as-caregivers by sustaining sex-neutral
family and medical leave as a remedy for sex discrimination. 116 And, as noted
above, the lead opinion in Casey makes the connection between women's
ability to participate as equals in society and their ability to control when and
whether to have children. 117 Casey, like Hibbs, recognizes care giving for
children as a major, life-shaping responsibility principally fulfilled by women.
An important next step toward egalitarianism and reproductive freedom in
work-family policy is to place higher priority on social and economic support
for caregivers, their dependants, and the caring relationship.118 Whether the
care is for their own or other people's children, care giving is overwhelmingly
done by women. If care of children were somehow magically assured, that
assurance would break the links between women's care for children, women's
relative economic marginalization in contrast to men, and the reproductive

115 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003).
116 [d. at 733-34.
117 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835 (1992) Ooint opinion of O'Connor, Souter,
and Kennedy, J.J., joined in relevant part by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.).
118 See Roberts, supra note 114, at 1043-52; EVA FEDER KITTAY, loVE'S LABOR (1999) (theorizing
supportive social responses to dependency as preconditions of sex equality); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, (1995)
(arguing that, in light of the centrality of children's dependency and mothers' nurturance, mother-child, rather
than husband-wife, should be considered the core familial relationship); Robin West, The RighI 10 Care, in
THE SUBJECf OF CARE 88-114 (Eva Feder Kinay & Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) (arguing for a legal right to
give care to dependants without thereby becoming impoverished).
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disempowerment of people otherwise discouraged from having children.
There is a large and growing literature on the need for better work-family
policy in the United States l19 and there appears to be support across the
political spectrum for many such measures. 120 Affordable child care and
universal public preschool,121 extended school days,122 paid family and medical
leave, sick days and family days,123 health care for all,124 good-quality, parttime, and flex-time jobs with benefits,125 a living wage,126 removal of welfare
"family caps,,,127 better tax benefits for parents, and a reversal of the trend
toward longer work weeks l28 each would help to break down barriers to
reproductive freedom and sex equality.
119 See. e.g., UNRNISHED WORK: BUILDING EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF WORKING
FAMILIES (Jody Heymann & Christopher Been eds., 2(05); JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME
DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER INEQUALITY (2004); JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS,
FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT (2003); WILLIAMS,
supra note 106.
120 See generally Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Georgetown University Law Center, Workplace Flexibility
2010, http://www.law.georgetown.edulworkplaceflexibility201O/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
121 See generally EDWARD ZIGLER ET AL., A VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION (2006);
SUZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN, AMERICA'S CHILD CARE PROBLEM (2002). The issues of
the sex inequalities and reproductive constraints on paid caregivers raise additional issues. Child care workers
often work long hours for little pay, working during their client families' work hours plus commuting time for
pay that generally comes out of the client's after-tax income. The client's money and time squeeze is passed
on in amplified form to the childcare worker. She, in turn, is left with little time to be with her own children,
and limited funds to pay for their care. The importance of child care work, and the market's inability to assure
adequate compensation for it, should be recognized with greater public funding for such care. Gornick &
Meyers, supra note 119, at 234.
122 See. e.g., GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 235; Lisa Demidovich, Expanding School Time as a
Workplace Reform: Why Workplace Reformers Should Get Involved in the Massachusetts Expanded Learning
Time Initiative (2006) (manuscript on file with author).
123 GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 112, 144--45; see, e.g. , California's recent legislation funding
family and medical leave through the state's unemployment compensation system. California Family Rights
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12945.1, 12945.2, 19702.3 (2005); NAT'L P'SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WHERE
FAMILIES MATTER: STATE PROGRESS TOWARD VALUING AMERICA'S FAMILIES (2006), http://www.
nationalpartnership.org/siteiDocServerlWhereFamiliesMatter2005Report.pdf?docID= I 056.
124 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights and Women's Reproductive Health, 24 STUD.
IN FAM. PLAN. 73,74--75,81-82 (1993).
125 See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 119, at 183-84; Vicki Shultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
1881,1936-37 (2000).
126 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 125, at 1945-48.
127 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 114, at 1059-60; Shames & Williams, supra note 112, at 838. See
generally SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN (2003) (arguing generally against all forms of welfare
caps).
128 See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 1-2
(1991) (arguing that despite the development of labor-saving technology, Americans are working ever-longer
hours); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 22
(1989) (studying heterosexual couples with children and concluding that, when housework and childcare are
taken into account, mothers work a month per year more than fathers); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA
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Interestingly, pro-life as well as pro-choice advocates have picked up on
the relationship between reproductive choice and support for family caregivers,
understanding that if mothers had more ability to participate in society as
equals, women might feel less need for abortion. Feminists for Life (FFL), a
nonprofit organization declaring itself in favor of equality for women and
against abortion, makes some claims that resonate with those of some prochoice feminists, and which should be common ground in the reproductive
rights battles. 129 According to FFL's mission statement, "[N]o woman should
be forced to choose between pursuing her education and career plans and
sacrificing her child.,,130 The group describes its aim "to eliminate, through
practical solutions, the root causes driving girls and women to abortion" by
advocating "affordable housing and healthcare for new parents, fighting family
caps in welfare reform, working for expansion of the Violence Against Women
Act, and seeking better enforcement on child support.,,131 FFL asserts that
"women deserve better" than abortion, and urges an end to the "lack of
practical resources and support" that make parenting so unthinkable for many
women. 132
Antiabortion and pro-choice feminists, as well as proponents of sex
equality more generally, should support legal, political, and cultural changes
that will enable women to bear children without sacrificing their futures. One
WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE
8-9 (2003) (arguing that two incomes are increasingly needed to support a family so that the loss of one
income now puts families at greater financial risk than in the past, when middle-class fathers could eam a
"family wage" and at-home mothers could get jobs to tide the family over economic rough patches).
129 See, e.g., FFL's Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.feministsforlife.org/FAQ/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2006) (explaining that FFL advocates better social support for mothers and favors greater
legal restrictions on abortion); Shames & Williams, supra note ll2,at 823 (critiquing, from a pro-choice
perspective, shortfalls in support for mothering as making abortion more necessary).
130 FFL's Mission, http://www.feministsforlife.orglwho/aboutus.htm(last visited Nov. 19,2006).
131 Nina J. Easton, Wife'S Role in Women's Group Now in Focus, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2005, at A9.
132 Feminists for Life, Jane Sullivan Roberts' Service to Women (2006), http://www.feministsforlife.orgl
news/jsroberts.htm. Other antiabortion activists recognize the connection between unplanned matemity and
women's prospects in life, but cynically seek to deny rather than change that reality. Paul Swope argues that
antiabortion advocates can reach young women more effectively if they depict women rejecting abortion, yet
thriving economically and remaining in control of their lives. Paul Swope, Abortion: A Failure to
Communicate, 82 FIRST THINGS 31 (1998). He analyses "extremely successful" antiabortion ads that send "the
subliminal message" of empowerment by depicting young women who faced unwanted pregnancies yet
eschewed abortion raking leaves in a nice suburban neighborhood as they send their children off to school or
out jogging toward clearing skies. ld. Those images of middle or upper-middle class, married life with
resources, leisure, and empowerment do not represent the facts for most young, single mothers. See, e.g.,
HAYS, supra note 127, at 179-8\. The ads Swope admires cynically underplay the connection between
reproductive control and women's life circumstances. They invert the reasoning of Casey to suggest that
maternity does not in fact intensify sex inequality and thus can be restricted consistent with women's rights.
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need not agree with FFL's claim that abortion is "never a solution" to the
"problems faced by women,,133 to see that FFL has it right in linking feminism,
reproductive freedom, and social support for care giving. The more society
supports pregnant women and parents in meeting their care-giving duties, the
more likely women will feel free to choose childbirth without fear of falling
out of the ranks of society's equals. The potential for agreement about
enhanced support for care giving among constituencies with widely divergent
.
f b .
.. 134
vIews
0 a ortlOn seems prorrusmg.
Social support for care giving implicates the workplace, welfare policy, and
the organization of the family. In addition to being the primary family
caregiver, most mothers-even those with very young children-work in the
paid labor force, and the majority of them work full time. Joan Williams's
pioneering work has argued that the workplace nonetheless remains designed
around the model of an "ideal worker" who is implicitly male-a worker who,
if he has children, is assumed to have a wife at home to care for them so that he
comes to work unencumbered by family care obligations. Many standard
features of the contemporary workplace date from a period of legally enforced,
sex-based separate spheres, and have a disproportionate adverse impact on
women. For example, workplace norms that insist on long, inflexible work
hours, put a premium on "face time" or require routine travel are considered to
be sex neutral. They are, however, biased against workers-disproportionately
women-who also fulfill dependant care obligations.
They are also
increasingly ill-suited to contemporary reality in which parents of both sexes
work, and fewer working parents of either sex have a homemaker spouse to
free them from family care responsibilities. 135 People on all sides of the
abortion debate who are committed to sex equality should support the idea of
making work and family more readily reconcilable.
Work-family reforms aimed at alleviating gender bias, however, also create
risks of intensifying it in a different form. Employers already see women as
mothers or potential mothers with family care obligations and discriminate
133 Serrin M. Foster, Feminists for Life of America, Women Deserve Better than Abortion (2004),
http://www.feministsforlife.org!news/wdb%20smf.htm. FFL seems to deny that the interests of women and
fetuses do sometimes conflict and that its support for outlawing abortion denies women's moral agency. See
Katha Pollitt, Feminists/or (Fetal) Life, NATION, Aug. 29, 2005, at 13.
134 See, e.g., Reducing the Need/or Abonion and Supporting Parents Act, H.R. 6067, I09th Congo (H.R.,
Sept. 13,2006). H.R. 6067 is a bipartisan bill proposing, inter alia, support for new parents as a way to reduce
the need for abortion. THIRD WAY CULTURE PROJECT, REDUCING THE NEED FOR ABORTION AND SUPPORTING
PARENTS ACT: A SUMMARY I (2006), http://www.third-way.com/data/productifile/60/Act_Summary_final.pdf.
135 See WILLIAMS, supra note 106.
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against them on the assumption that they do or will fall short of the ideal
worker norm. 136 That kind of discrimination could worsen if employers
expanded support for care in the ways just described, and if most of the
employees who took advantage of the policies were women. If measures like
paid family leave make employers view women in general as costlier, more
cumbersome employees than men, work-family policies designed to help
working parents will boomerang against working women.
That is one reason why the cultural feminist emphasis on supporting care
and other "feminine" values and activities in which women have found
fulfillment and happiness is not enough by itself to lead to sex equality; it
needs to join liberal and dominance feminist strategies for equalizing women's
power and choices in traditionally male-dominated and defined spheres like the
workplace. 137 Some of the boomerang effect of generous work-family policy
might be avoided by government subsidization of family-friendly employment
policies; if the 'government foots the bill, employer incentives to discriminate
against women to avoid costly work-family accommodations are blunted. But
social cost spreading alone does not remedy the whole problem.
Not only should family-friendly work opportunities be offered on a sexneutral basis, but men, too, should be encouraged to take advantage of them. 138
Sex-role stereotyping is fed by strongly gendered patterns of group behavior,
so that if employers see more women nurturing and more men running things,
they will continue to associate femaleness with nurturance and maleness with
leadership and to discriminate accordingly.139 Sex-based disparate treatment
136 See, e.g .• Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,736-37 (2003) (confirming the existence
of gender discrimination in the workplace based on the stereotype of women as caregivers); WILLIAMS, supra
note 106, at 250.
137 Mary Becker takes care to make a point, often lost in oversimplified efforts to distinguish strands of
feminist thought, that "[r]elational [cultural] feminism does not reject either the equal treatment of similarlysituated women and men (formal equality's focus) nor more power as it is currently defined (dominance
feminism's focus)," even as she emphasizes that cultural feminism "has a different focus." Becker, supra note
23, at 48.
138 Although men cannot get pregnant, give birth, or nurse, they can do everything else associated with
care for dependant children. Thus, men can participate in the vast majority of family care work. Analyses of
sex equality and parenting should start by decoupling all forms of family care which both men and women can
do from pregnancy disability-the period when birth, and sometimes pregnancy, disables women uniquely
from engaging in other activities like school or work.
139 New research on social cognition has confirmed with neurological data that our brains absorb
stereotypes, which impact our interpersonal and intrapersonal relations. See Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony
G. Greenwald, ImpliCit Gender Stereot)ping in Judgmellls of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181
(1995); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scielllijic Foundations, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 954-58 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1512-14 (2005).
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of women in the workforce will persist as long as employers have reason to
view women, and not men, as nonideal workers due to women's
disproportionate burden of family care. 140
Cultural norms must continue to shift to prompt men to be more involved
in parenting, and those shifts occur slowly. Our sex-based assumptions are so
ingrained that they feel natural, and become almost invisible. How routinely
do employers ask female and not male employment applicants about children
and childcare plans, without it occurring to them that such questions might
amount to sex discrimination?141 How many of us in our personal lives have
responded to news that a heterosexual, working couple is expecting a child by
inquiring or wondering about when, whether, and on what terms the woman
will return to work after the baby comes-without likewise wondering about
the man? We all live in the shadow of earlier generations. When heterosexual
parents disagree about the fairness of the division of family and household
care, the woman may feel resentful of her partner for falling short of doing
fifty percent of the housework and family care, while the man may feel
virtuous for doing so much more than his own father did. And to the extent
that parenting requires supportive, nurturing, and empathic traits culturally
associated with femininity, being observed as an involved father with a core
caretaking role is bound to feel threatening to a man. 142 While employment

140 It is also important to employ men in the childcare field. Children who see only women as caregivers
will inevitably grow up inculcated with stereotypes about sex and care giving.
141 See WILLIAMS, supra note 106, at 207 (arguing that workplaces designed for the bodies and life
patterns of men-without allowing time off for childbearing-illegally discriminate based on sex); see also,
Moms Rising Petition, hnp:llwww.momsrising.orgJPA (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (petition supporting two
Pennsylvania bills, H.B. 352 and S.B. 440, that would add language to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
making it illegal for employers to ask these kinds of questions, suggesting such behavior is not already illegal).
142 Becker's illuminating analysis, drawing on the work of sociologist Allan G. Johnson, explains male
oppression of women as deriving less from men's desire to control women than from men's fear of other men
and their concomitant drive for archetypal male attributes of control, power, autonomy, rationality, and
strength. Becker, supra note 23, at 27. On that account, oppression of women is more a side effect than an
objective of patriarchy. One function of women under patriarchy is to help to define and support the
masculinity of "their men," in part through contrast:
Men are men to the extent that they are not women: masculine, independent, invulnerable, tough,
strong, aggressive, powerful, commanding, in control, rational, and non-emotional. "Real
women" (that is, middle- or upper-middle-class white women) are dependent, vulnerable, pliant,
weak, supportive, nurturing, intuitive, emotional, and empathic.
Id. at 27 (citing ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 35
(1997)).
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law can prompt some progress on these issues, the levers of change also need
to extend to the law and culture governing family life. 143
Many people assume-whether consciously or not-that even though men
can nurture children, women like it more and are better at it. They think that it
is unwise, counterproductive, probably futile, and not a necessary aspect of sex
equality for men, on average, equally to contribute to family care. There are,
however, substantial reasons to question those assumptions. As discussed in
Part I, identification of male and female preferences and characteristics has
long been bedeviled by the problem of adaptive preferences, making it difficult
to distinguish what we really want from what legal and cultural role-typing
have taught us to accept. 144 Substantial new research on gender and the brain
have been viewed as added support for theories of hard-wired sex differences,
but the data is complex and conflicting. 145 Moreover, nobody denies the
substantial overlap between the neurological characteristics of the sexes as
groups, nor contends that we should necessarily behave the way that we are
"wired" to act. 146 Plus, even if all or most men were shown to be different in
relevant respects from all or most women, different kinds of people can be
very good parents-indeed, the liberty rights of parents to decide how to raise
their children is founded on that notion. 147
Over time, men may come to identify more strongly with their parental role
so that fewer fathers opt out of care, more gay male couples raise children, and
fewer mothers decide against co-parenting with men. The kinds of patriarchal
attitudes that tolerate male abandonment of children to their mothers, and that
discourage men-whether single or in couples-from being engaged and
143 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies 10 Remedy the
Gender Gap, 82 GEO. LJ. 89 (1993) (arguing that the gender wage gap appears to require legal intervention in
the family and household structure and cannot be achieved by labor market policy alone).
144 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
145 See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE viii (2002) (arguing that we underestimate the extent of
neurological sex differences); Elizabeth S. Spelke, Sex Differences in Intrinsic Aptitudefor Math and Science:
A Critical Review, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 950 (2005) (arguing that we overestimate the extent of neurological sex
differences); The Science of Gender and Science: Pinker vs. Spelke Debate, Edge: The Third Culture, May 16,
2005, http://www.edge.orgl3rd_culture/debate05/debate05_index.html.
146 For example, the propensity to engage in physical violence against other human beings may be
"natural," but organized societies nonetheless tightly regulate uses of force.
147 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63, 66 (2000) (acknowledging that "demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family" and reaffirming parents'
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the "care, custody, and control" of their children); Pierce v.
Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the rights of parents and guardians "to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control" as an element of constitutional liberty that "excludes
any general power of the state to standardize its children").
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nurturing parents, are gradually eroding. 148 So, too, the taboos against male
child care workers may be softening.
Still, for many women, getting men involved in the care of their children is
hopeless, irrelevant, or affirmatively unwelcome. Today, approximately one
third of children in the United States live in single-parent families 149 and 90%
of those are headed by women. 150 Many children are now raised by lesbian
couples, and straight and lesbian women increasingly are choosing to become
pregnant-through artificial insemination or otherwise-in circumstances that
legally and socially exclude the sperm donor from having any paternal role.
Even for these women, who may not have or particularly wish to have men
involved in the care of their children, it is nonetheless important that the
politics of care be seen as a men's issue, too. Social support for care giving is
likely to be inadequate as long as care giving is thought to be women's domain
and its conditions only a "women's issue." Women have always prioritized
care and have needed support to do it well, but the experience of history shows
that, without a politics of care that implicates men as well, women's needs are
not a sufficiently high social priority. Even men who are not substantially
involved in primary care giving should express their commitment to sex
equality by actively supporting family-friendly law and policy.
In that regard, the pitch used by a new, energetic, internet-based grassroots

campaign seeking a range of work-family reforms seems counterproductive. A
coalition that calls itself "Moms Rising" promotes a policy agenda entitled
"The Motherhood Manifesto," and consistently refers to the work-family
policy needs, not of parents, but of "moms.,,151 Part of the feminist effort to
shift cultural norms toward more representative inclusion of traditionally
"feminine" values appropriately affIrms using language and imagery familiar

148 See Robert Pear, Married and Single Parents Spending More Time with Children. Study Finds, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 17,2006, at AI2 (reviewing a new book by the Russell Sage Foundation and the American
Sociological Association entitled Changing Rhythms of American Family Life, and observing that "the amount
of child care and housework performed by fathers has sharply increased, researchers say in a new study, based
on analysis of thousands of personal diaries").
149 In 2005, 33% of children under 18 lived in single-parent homes. Forum on Family and Child
Statistics, America's Children in Brief: Key National Indicators of Well-Being (2006), http://www.
childstats.govl americaschildren/pop.asp.
150 Jacqueline Kirby, Single Parem Families in Poverty, I HUM. DEV. & FAM. LIFE BULL. I, I (1995).
151 Several of the organizations working in coalition with Moms Rising are likewise directed at mothers,
not parents. Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue, Mothers and More, Mothers Movement Online, Mother: The
Job, Mothers Ought to Have Equal Rights, and the National Partnership for Women and Families are some of
the groups represented. See About Moms Rising, http://www.momsrising.org/aboutmomsrising (last visited
Nov. 19,2006).
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and comfortable to women, as well as grassroots organizing techniques
pioneered by and for women (e.g., at-home get-togethers at which children are
welcome). But the public relations strategy here strongly signals that these are
"women's issues" without importance for men, and its bouncy tone hints that
the organizations' political work-like a girls' night out-would really be a lot
less fun if men were involved. To the extent that this approach gives men a
pass, it should cause concern.
Further, claiming family issues as women's political turf suggests that
cultural feminists lack the courage of their convictions. The ethics and traits
associated with femininity that cultural feminism champions are valuable
enough that the entire society, not women alone, should aspire to fulfill them.
The work of Carol Gilligan herself, whose In a Different Voice is viewed as an
iconic work of cultural feminism, supports greater male involvement in family
care giving. Although Gilligan generally associates distinct forms of moral
reasoning with males and females, she is very careful to explain that these are
only general typologies. 152 Her own conclusion is that moral growth for
persons whose reasoning might be characterized as masculine would involve
working to adapt moral insight more typically associated with the feminine,
and vice versa. I53 In other words, Gilligan's work suggests that it is beneficial
for women and men both to strive for broader range in terms of their life values
and experiences by learning more from the "opposite" sex.
An equality and reproductive rights agenda should thus focus on shifting
the workplace away from the implicitly male "ideal worker" norm and toward
an assumption that workers of both sexes have equal potential and
responsibility as caregivers. It should advocate legal, political, and cultural
changes that would share the burdens and joys of parenting and bread winning
more equitably between women and men. Men should not be let off the hook,
whether on the micro level of care for children, or the macro level of pushing
for legal and policy changes that better support care giving. By emphasizing
the extent to which care for society's dependants should be understood as a
duty of men and women alike, equality analysis can help to make decisions to
have children more realistic and responsible.

152
153

See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 1-2 (1982).
[d.
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CONCLUSION

Sex equality law is strong and dynamic, yet this Article points to some of
the work it has yet to do. The hurdles identified here are not trivial. Equal
protection doctrine has never been stronger in its condemnation of sex-based
stereotypes, yet in the critical areas of teen sexuality and sex education, our
culture, politics, and courts have yet to fully repudiate sex-based double
standards. Promulgation of stereotypes in sex education should be treated as
unconstitutional for the same reasons that equal protection rejects denial of
opportunity based on stereotypes. Equal protection, properly understood, is
not limited to redressing sex-based inequality of educational benefits or
opportunities, but also forecloses efforts to shape youth behavior in
stereotypically gendered ways. I have argued for sex education that overtly
and comprehensively repudiates sexual double standards and the harms they
help to foster and obscure, and embraces egalitarian social and sexual values.
The contraceptive equity example shows conflicts within our legal
understandings of whether and how reproductive distinctiveness triggers sex
discrimination. Competing strands of existing law treat disadvantage based on
women's reproductive distinctiveness either as not sex based, or as sex
discrimination only to the extent that it can be analogized to some male
circumstance and thus conceptualized as nondistinctive after all. Equality
analysis of contraceptive coverage suggests that the law should go further to
support contraceptive equity, not only to make women's health insurance
benefits as comprehensive as men's, but also to render women and men's
reproductive distinctiveness equally nondisadvantaging. The law should do so
by making women's reproductive health needs part of the baseline for
coverage of facially sex-neutral benefit plans. Discrimination thrives where
women have attributes-like distinctions in reproductive capacity-that make
women seem differently situated from men. That is where Geduldig, broadly
read, cuts equal protection off. If women as reproducing persons are equal to
men, equality law must account for the circumstances and needs of women as
normal, baseline human conditions.
Finally, the work-family conflict underscores how the law and society have
hesitated to imagine, embrace, and support egalitarian parenting and work. We
need, paradoxically, both greater and less recognition of mothering. Society
should expand support for parents of both sexes, and exert cultural and
institutional pressure on men to do their part. At the same time, women's
second shift must not be recognized too much in the form of maternal-wall
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stereotyping and discrimination, which overestimates the extent to which
parenting interferes with women's workforce performance. Better support for
care giving and erosion of sex stereotyping would both be facilitated if men
participated, and were seen to participate, more in the direct provision and in
the politics of care. Social support offered to "parents" but used by mothers is
unlikely to be robust and risks intensifying sex discrimination. We disserve
both sex equality and reproductive rights when we let work-family policy be
cast as just a "women's issue."
We sometimes write or teach feminist legal theory as if its various strands
are in conflict or mutually exclusive-suggesting that a legal thinker or a legal
reform must be cultural, liberal, dominance, or postmodern feminist, but not all
of them at once. Equality analyses of reproductive rights illustrate that the
strands often work best together as a kind of cosmopolitan feminist tl~~ory,
taking account of all available tools and modes of analysis and using the
disparate approaches to cross-check and enrich one another. Dominance
feminism has pointed out the importance of sites of sex subordination-like
those examined here-that we might otherwise tend to miss, and the
interconnections between disparate aspects of a patriarchal system, like
sexuality, procreation, maternity, and work. This Article's three topics also
underscore the importance of themes associated with liberal feminism--of
describing and treating people evenhandedly and neutrally, without
stereotyping, in part to reflect optimism about individual capacities to defy
expectations, and to open the way concretely and imaginatively for society as a
whole to become more equitable. Postmodern feminism, recognizing that
gender is socially constructed and that language plays a major role in
constructing it, also supports antistereotyping doctrine by helping, for example,
to explain the harms of propagating sexual double standards, of naturalizing
"mothering" as a female trait, and of describing work-family balance as a
"women's issue." Postmodernism also has helped to uncover missing
discourses of female desire and male vulnerability and shows that both menespecially gender nonconforming men-and women can be sexually
victimized. Cultural feminism's embrace of values and needs traditionally
associated with women and relegated to "feminine" spheres offers a crucial
corrective to the law's tendency to define "neutrality" in terms that are
implicitly male or male-privileging-whether they are standards of health
coverage that exclude contraception, or a norm of the "ideal worker" assumed
to be unencumbered by family care responsibilities. Cultural feminism seeks
to shift the center of normative gravity in a "feminine" direction on issues of
sexuality, procreation, family, and work. In short, dominance feminism shows
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us why we are angry, liberal feminism keeps us hoping, postmodem feminism
reminds us to think harder about who "we" are and could be, and cultural
feminism teaches us that we must still trust our values and ourselves.
I have suggested here that equal protection and privacy are overlapping
constitutional grounds for reproductive rights, and that reproductive rights, in
turn, undergird sex equality. I have sought to do so with the aid of a range of
analytic tools from feminist legal theory deployed in a cosmopolitan
theoretical approach that I hope is stronger than the sum of its parts. All of
these visions of sex equality and reproductive rights are ones that can be shared
by people whether they view themselves as pro-life or pro-choice. If society
were willing to recognize the demands of equality in these three areas, there
might well be less need for abortion. Filling out the reproductive rights agenda
with measures that make abortion less necessary is one way to seek progress,
notwithstanding legal and cultural conflict about abortion itself. This Article
has pointed out some uses of sex equality law to that effect.
Casting reproductive rights in terms of equality holds promise to recenter
the debate towards the real stakes for women (and men) of unwanted
pregnancy and away from the deceptive images of fetus-as-autonomous-being
that the anti-choice movement has popularized since the advent of
amniocentesis. Equality analysis may help to elaborate the price for women of
existing reproductive law and policy. Another possibility, however, is that
equality analysis of reproductive rights would change very little. If equality
merely helps women to be as reproductively irresponsible as men, allowing
women to have sex followed by abortions for unwanted pregnancy, women
could have formally more equal sexual freedom but are unlikely to advance
toward sex equality in the ways I call for here. Formalistic equality arguments
narrowly focused on abortion could actually make substantive equality in areas
like contraceptive access, work-family policy, and sex education harder rather
than easier to achieve. As I noted at the outset, if abortion rights are viewed as
making women more like men, such equalization might legitimate a status quo
that fails to address the broader set of issues highlighted here. In the end,
equality analysis of reproductive rights tells us as much about what more we
might want from equality as it does about why reproductive rights are
important.
Resorting to equality law-and an omnivorous approach to equality law at
that-in support of reproductive rights is not just an opportunistic effort to find
something that works. Effective, non-stereotyping sex education, full and
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equal access to contraception, and jobs compatible with family care not only
enhance reproductive freedom, but thereby promote sex equality. These
measures are facets of the larger project of empowering women and men to
become equal agents of our own sexual and procreative destinies. We all
should be fully eligible for pleasure, safety, health, and-should we elect to
have children-both parental intimacy and economic empowerment. The turn
to equal protection as a source of law for reproductive rights is the right way to
go because, in battles over reproductive rights, sex equality is so centrally at
stake.
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